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The fundamental claim that the Restatement (Third) of Torts:
General Principlesmakes about strict liability is striking and bold.1
The Restatement (Third) claims that there are only special instances
of strict liability. Negligence is a general legal principle, but strict

Professor of Law, University of Southern California Law School I am grateful to Lewis
Saragentich, Scott Altman, the participants at the Wade conference, and especially Bob Rabin,
for their comments.
1.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: GENERAL PRINCIPLES § 18 (Preliminary Draft No. 2)
[hereinafter Preliminary Draft No. 2].
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liability is a set of particular doctrines. 2 Curiously, however, the
Restatement (Third) also takes the position that strict liability is a
unified form of liability; it characterizes strict liability as liability for
the characteristic risks of an activity.' So the Restatement (Third)'s
claim that strict liability is a set of special cases seems to be a claim
that strict liability is not a coherent general conception of
responsibility for accidental physical injury in the way that fault
liability is. This claim strikes me as mistaken. The idea of liability for
characteristic risk expresses a conception of responsibility for
accidental physical injury that is as coherent and as general as the
conception embodied by the fault principle. Whereas the fault
principle holds actors accountable for injuries issuing from risks
whose imposition should have been prevented ab initio, the strict
liability principle holds actors accountable for injuries that flow from
their agency. Strict liability expresses "the notion that losses should
be borne by the doer, the enterprise, rather than distributed on the
basis of fault."4 Fault liability makes wrongful agency the
fundamental basis of responsibility for harm accidentally done; strict
liability makes agency itself the fundamental basis of responsibility.
The distinctive modern form of strict liability-enterprise
liability-is a particular articulation of what it means to make agency
the basis of responsibility. Two propositions form the core of
enterprise liability. First, activities should bear their characteristic
accident costs.5 Fault liability pins the costs of the nonnegligent
accidents that are the long-run price of an activity's presence in the
world on the random victims of the activity. Enterprise liability pins
those accident costs on the activity-the enterprise-which imposed
the nonnegligent risks responsible for the injuries at issue. Second,
enterprise liability holds that an enterprise's accident costs should be
distributed among the members of the enterprise. The costs of an
injury should be shared by those who profit from the activity
responsible for the injury; they should not be concentrated on the
injured party, or be dispersed across unrelated activities. 6 These two
propositions are often linked to a particular conception of fairness.
Fairness requires a just distribution of burdens and benefits. It

2.
Id.
3.
Id.
4.
Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE
L.J. 499, 500 (1961). Calabresi is epitomizing the modern idea of enterprise liability.
5.
Id.
6.
There are ways of dispersing losses without dispersing them across those responsiblo for
the losses in question. First-party loss insurance tends to disperse losses in just this way.
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therefore gives rise to a presumption that the costs of the accidental
physical injuries characteristic of an activity should be borne by those
who benefit from the activity, whether or not they are culpably
responsible for precipitating the injuries at issue.7 These propositions
are also frequently linked to economic ideas of allocative efficiency and
loss-spreading. 8
Enterprise liability is a general and distinctively modern
theory of strict liability. Whereas traditional strict liability expressed
the maxim that those who act do so at their peril, 9 enterprise liability
expresses the maxim that those who profit from the imposition of risk
should bear the costs of the accidents that are a price of their profits.
Indeed, the theory of enterprise liability originated outside the law of
torts, in a distinctively modern piece of legislation-the Workers'
Compensation schemes enacted in England and the United States
around the turn of the twentieth century. From its stronghold in these
acts, the theory of enterprise liability spread back through the
common law of torts, making its presence felt in traditional common
law fields of strict liability such as vicarious liability i0 and abnormally
7. See Gregory C. Keating, The Idea of Fairness in the Law of Enterprise Liability, 95
MICH. L. REv. 1266, 1269 (1997).
8. The work of Guido Calabresi is preeminent here. See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF
ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970) [hereinafter CALABREsI, COSTS OF
ACCIDENTS]; Calabresi, supra note 4, at 500-07; Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a
Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055, 1067-69 (1972) [hereinafter Calabresi &
Hirschoff Strict Liability]. More recently, the theory has been developed by Jon Hanson, Kyle
Logue, and Steven Croley. See e.g., Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, The Nonpecuniary Costs
of Accidents: Painand Suffering Damages in Tort Law, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1785, 1896-97 (1995);
Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, Rescuing the Revolution: The Reuivcd Case for Enterprise
Liability, 91 MICI. L, REV. 683, 710-12 (1993); Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The First-Party
Insurance Externality: An Economic Justificationfor EnterpriseLiability, 76 CORNELL L, REV.
129, 172-73 (1990). See also William K. Jones, Strict Liability for Hazardous Enterprise, 92
COLUM. L. REV. 1705, 1775-77 (1992). Finally, some important views do not fit neatly into either
the fairness or the efficiency camps. See, e.g., VIRGINIA E. N0LAN & ED.%UWND URSIN,
UNDERSTANDING ENTERPRISE LIABILITY: RETHINKING TORT REFORM- FOR THE T%,;ENrY-FIRST
CENTURY (1995) [hereinafter NOLAN & URSIN, UNDERSTANDING ENTERPRISE LIABILITY]; Virginia

E. Nolan & Edmund Ursin, The Deacademificationof Tort Thcory, 48 U. KAN. L. REV. 59, 59-60
(1999).
9. The distinction is recognized in both case law and scholarship. See, e.g., Chavez v. S.
Pac. Transp. Co., 413 F. Supp. 1203, 1211 (E.D. Cal. 1976) (distinguishing between strict liability
"imposed on the innocent but dangerous actor because his conduct is anti-social" and "strict
liability [imposed] because certain activity is so dangerous that such a standard is thought
necessary to distribute the loss among the general public"); Robert L. Rabin, Some Thoughts on
the Ideology of EnterpriseLiability, 55 MD. L. REv. 1190, 1194-99 (1996).
10. See, e.g., Taber v. Maine, 45 F.3d 598, 603 (2d Cir. 1995) (Calabresi, J.) (noting that "as
early as 1961, commentators noted that California had taken the lead in equating the scope of
respondeat superior liability to the traditionally broader coverage mandated by worker's
compensation statutes," and citing Calabresi, supra note 4, at 545) opinion replaced by,
remanded by, 67 F.3d 598 (2d Cir. 1995); Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States. 398 F.2d
167, 171 (2d Cir. 1968) (Friendly, J.) ("The proper test here bears far more resemblance to that
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dangerous activity liability, and influenced the rise of products
liability.1 1 Indeed, over the course of the twentieth century, enterprise
liability came to unify and infuse much of traditional, common law
strict liability.
It is therefore surprising and disturbing that the theory of
enterprise liability does not make any appearance at all in the
Restatement (Third): General Principles. It is surprising because
enterprise liability has been and remains a prominent part of the law
of torts; it therefore deserves to be included in any Restatement of the
law of torts. It is disturbing because silently excluding enterprise
liability from the law of torts converts strict liability from a principle
of accountability that is as general as-and competitive with-the
fault principle into a set of discrete doctrines. Two general principles
of responsibility exist in the law of torts, vying for control of its
various domains; yet only one is being acknowledged by the
Restatement (Third).
This decision to treat strict liability doctrines as a set of
isolated exceptions is a fateful one. What we make of a tort principle
or a tort doctrine depends, to an important extent, on how we conceive
it. If we deny strict liability the status of a general principle, we
thereby bless fault liability. Fault liability becomes the preferred form
of tort liability simply because it is the only general ground of tort
liability. Special circumstances will have to be present before strict
liability even comes to mind.
On the one hand, conceiving of fault as the only general
principle of responsibility for injury accidentally inflicted tends to
make the sphere of fault liability expand and the sphere of strict
liability contract. If fault is the only general principle of liability, we
should prefer fault to strict liability unless special circumstances
counsel otherwise. On the other hand, conceiving of particular strict

which limits liability for workmen's compensation than to the test for negligence."); Fruit v.
Schreiner, 502 P.2d 133, 141 (Alaska 1972) ('The basis of respondeatsuperior has been correctly
stated as 'the desire to include in the costs of operation inevitable losses to third persons incident
to carrying on an enterprise, and thus distribute the burden among those benefited by the
enterprise' .... The principle has been recognized by every state in the enactment of women's
compensation laws... ")(quoting Smith, Frolic and Detour, 23 COLUM. L. REV. 717, 718 (1923));
Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles, 814 P.2d 1341, 1349 (Cal. 1991) (costs issuing from the abuse of
police authority "should be borne by the community, because of the substantial benefits that the
community derives from the lawful exercise of police power").
11. George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the
IntellectualFoundationsof Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461 (1985) offers one influential
but controversial account of the influence of enterprise liability on product liability law. For
criticism, see Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginning and the Possible End of the Rise of Modern
American Tort Law, 26 GA. L. REV. 601, 602 (1992).

2001]

ENTERPRISE LIABILITY

1289

liability doctrines as a set of anomalous exceptions to tort law's
general preference for fault liability tends to induce the contraction of
those doctrines whose strictness is both undeniable and beyond
uprooting. We will be inclined to construe strict liability doctrines
more narrowly when we conceive of them as anomalous exceptions to
the fault principle, and more broadly when we conceive them as
principled expressions of enterprise liability. We might tend, for
example, to classify activities as abnormally dangerous only when
imposing strict liability seems likely to achieve the primary aim of
negligence liability-inducing actors to conduct their risky activities
more safely. 12 Or we might tend to construe the "scope of employment"
rule in vicarious liability law as a kind of surrogate negligence
liability, imposing liability only when we can imagine inducing some
kind of increased precaution. 13
If we conceive of strict liability as a competing general principle
of responsibility, our law will tend to be different. We will not be
reflexively inclined to prefer fault to strict liability; indeed we may be
inclined in the opposite direction. If we believe that activities should
generally bear their characteristic accident costs, we will tend to press
for stricter forms of liability, and we will be inclined to interpret strict
doctrines expansively. We might tend, for example, to classify
activities as abnormally dangerous whenever subjecting them to strict
liability will distribute the burdens and benefits of their inevitable
accidents more fairly, and even if subjecting these activities to strict
liability is not likely to induce greater precaution. We may also tend to
find acts within the scope of an employee's employment whenever
holding employers liable for those acts will align the burdens and
benefits of some activity more fairly, and even if including these acts
within the scope of employment is not likely to induce greater
14
precaution.
Our law, in short, is theory laden and reflexive. What it is and
what it becomes depend, in important part, on what we think it is and
what we think it should be. Because our law is shaped by our
conceptions of it, our conceptions of it-and our Restatements of itmatter. My aim in this Paper is to illustrate the way in which
enterprise liability has influenced and might continue to influence the
shape of tort law. First, I shall trace the course of enterprise liability

12. See Konradi v. United States, 919 F.2d 1207, 1210 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J.); see also
infra Part I.
13. See Indiana Harbor Belt R.I v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 916 F.2d 1174, 1177 (7th Cir.
1990) (Posner, J.); see also infra Part III.
14. See infra Part III.
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through three pieces of twentieth century tort scholarship. Second, I
shall show how the acceptance or rejection of enterprise liability
conceptions influenced the interpretation of familiar strict liability
doctrines. Third, I shall consider the subterranean influence of
enterprise liability conceptions on negligence doctrines. Finally, I shall
consider how these varying conceptions of strict liability should affect
the approach that the Restatement (Third): General Principles adopts
towards strict liability.
The articles that I consider-Jeremiah Smith's Sequel to
Workmen's Compensation Acts, 15 Young B. Smith's Frolic and
Detour,16 and Guido Calabresi's Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution
and the Law of Torts' 7-document the birth of enterprise liability in
the Workers' Compensation Acts enacted around the turn of the
twentieth century and its subsequent spread into the common law of
torts. Jeremiah Smith's article argues that, by repudiating the fault
liability around which the common law of torts had been constructed
in the latter half of the eighteenth century and embracing strict
liability, the Workers' Compensation Acts made the law of accidents a
house divided against itself. The Acts were therefore bound, in Smith's
view, to initiate a revolution in the common law of torts. Jeremiah
Smith's predictions were eerily prescient. Many of the doctrinal
developments he foresaw came to pass. Young B. Smith's article
argues that the enterprise liability theory of the Workers'
Compensation Acts justifies the otherwise anomalous doctrine of
respondeat superior and enables us to give a principled interpretation
of the scope of that liability. With that theory in hand, respondeat
superior ceases to be an archaic oddity and becomes the principal
common law expression of a distinctively modern sense of justice.
Building quite self-consciously on their pioneering work, Guido
Calabresi's article fashions a general economic theory of enterprise
liability and applies that theory to the leading strict liability tort
doctrines. Over the course of the three articles, enterprise liability
receives ever more bold, and ever more general, expression.
The cases and doctrines I discuss in the second and third
sections are selected more or less ahistorically. They are chosen with
an eye to showing that the choice between enterprise and fault
justifications for strict liability doctrines is an important one. Because
my doctrinal examples are not chosen to illustrate an historical

15.
(1914).

Jeremiah Smith, Sequel to Workmen's Compensation Acts, 27 HARV. L. REV. 235, 344

16. Young B. Smith, Frolicand Detour, 23 COLUM. L. REV. 444, 716 (1923).
17.

Calabresi, supra note 4.
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progression, it may be worth noting, at the outset, the historical fact
that enterprise liability flowered both in legal scholarship and legal
doctrine over the course of the twentieth century. It flowered, not
because it generated wholly new doctrines, but because it enabled the
reconceptualization of old ones. The legal historian G. Edward White
illustrates enterprise liability's influence on the conceptual structure
of tort law when he observes that "[b]y the 1930's scholars had begun
to treat cases imposing strict liability as a separate category of Torts
rather than as a 'peculiar' set of exceptions."18 The shift from "peculiar
exceptions" to cohesive category is not a shift in doctrinal coverage,
but rather it is a shift in doctrinal conceptualization. As enterprise
liability ideas seeped into the law of torts, strict liability was seen and
thought of as a coherent general alternative to negligence liability.
The development White describes was hardly an isolated one.
In the thirties, forties, and fifties, prominent legal scholars, including
Charles Gregory, Fleming James, Friedrich Kessler, and William
Prosser, were favorably disposed to enterprise liability.19 In the 1960s
and 1970s, Guido Calabresi set out to develop a systematic economic
articulation and defense of enterprise liability.20 Enterprise liability
conceptions found their way into numerous legal opinions-opinions
dealing with the scope of employment doctrine in vicarious liability
21
law, with abnormally dangerous activities, and with product defects.
Although enterprise liability's precise influence on important fields of
law such as product liability is hotly contested, 22 and although
enterprise liability has come under sustained attack during the past
twenty years, it continues to attract the support of influential legal
scholars and it continues to crop up in cases. Enterprise liability, in
short, could not credibly be omitted from a history of twentieth
century tort law and scholarship.

18. G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW INAMERIcA 109 (1980).
19. See generally CHARLES GREGORY, LEGISLATIVE LOSS DISTRIBtrriON IN NEGLIGENCE
ACTIONS (1936); WHITE, supra note 18, at 109-10 168-73. 198-200 (1980); Fleming James, Jr.,
Accident Liability Reconsidered- The Impact of Liability Insurance, 57 YALE J. 549 (1948);
William Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 MINN. L. REV. 791 (1966); William Prosser, The
Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 YALE IJ. 1099 (1960).
20. See generally CALABRESI, COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 8; Calabresi, supra note 4;
Calabresi & Hirschoif Strict Liability, supranote 8.
21. Some such decisions are discussed infra Part II.
22. Compare, for example, the accounts of product liability law found in Priest, supra note
11, with Schwartz, supra note 11, at 605-20 and WH1TE, supranote 18, at 168-72.
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I. THE THEORY OF ENTERPRISE LIABILITY: FROM THE
WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACTS TO COMMON LAW STRICT
23
LIABILITY

A. Jeremiah Smith: the Workers' CompensationActsas a Challenge to
the Common Law of Torts
1. Jeremiah Smith's Theory and Prophesy
Writing in 1914, Jeremiah Smith asserted that "[t]he
fundamental principle of the modern common law of torts is, that fault
is requisite to liability."2 4 Strict liability was confined to "a number of
well-recognized exceptions," albeit exceptions "covering a good deal of
ground."2 5 Most of these exceptions rested on "distinct and sufficient
reasons, founded on considerations of public policy,"26 and none
constituted a general challenge to the primacy of fault liability. To
prove his point, Smith singled out three of these exceptions for
discussion: the doctrine of respondeatsuperior; the " 'halfway' doctrine
of the maritime law .

.

. [that] if a seaman is taken sick or is hurt

while in service of the vessel, the ship is held for the expense of his
care and cure, irrespective of fault on the part of those controlling the
vessel;" 27 and the doctrine of strict liability for extra-hazardous
activities.
Smith's discussion of vicarious liability illustrates both his
general method and his reasons for thinking that common law
instances of strict liability, no matter how numerous, did not
constitute a general challenge to the primacy of the fault principle.
Smith conceded that the doctrine of respondeat superior, "though
exceptional, is no doubt firmly established and not likely to be
overthrown." 28 Smith argued, however, that respondeat superior was
not a general threat to the primacy of the fault principle. For one
thing, the doctrine of respondeat superior does not dispense with all

23. NoLAN & URSIN, UNDERSTANDING ENTERPRISE LIABILITY, supra note 8, also traco
enterprise liability back to the Worker's Compensation Acts. See id. at 5. George Priest's
influential article The Invention of Enterprise Liability, supra note 11, however, does not
recognize the significance of these Acts.
24. Smith, supra note 15, at 344.
25. Id. at 240 (citing J.P. Hall, 19 J. POL. ECON. 698-700 for a "condensed summary of
exceptions").
26. Id.
27. Id. at 256-57.
28. Id. at 256.
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fault. It is a hybrid doctrine in that it dispenses only with fault on the
part of the master. This undercuts any argument for generalized strict
liability on the basis of respondeat superior:
Because the law holds an owner responsible for harm due to faults committed by his
servants in the conduct of his business, it does not follow that the law should also hold
him responsible for harm happening without any fault on the part of any person
whatever. In the first case an existing fault of his subordinate is, whether justly or
unjustly, imputed to the owner. In the second case there is no fault of anyone to be
imputed to him.P

Second, Smith argued that respondeat superior"is admittedly a harsh
doctrine; and it is doubtful whether the arguments in its favor would
have prevailed, if servants in general had had the pecuniary ability of
their employers."30 Respondeat superioris, in short, an anomaly, "not
a doctrine to be extended by analogy."3' The same was true of the "
'halfway' doctrine of the maritime law" requiring those in charge of
vessels to take care of seamen who are injured or fall ill in the course
of their service 32 and of common law strict liability for extra-hazardous
activities. Each of these rested on special reasons and special
histories. Neither was capable of generalization, and neither,
therefore, threatened the supremacy of fault within the common law
of torts.
The Workmen's Compensation Acts, however, were different.
They did constitute a radical challenge to the authority of the fault
principle:
There is a movement now going on in this country for the enactment of legislation
based upon the principle of the English Workmen's Compensation Act. This legislation
is founded largely upon a theory inconsistent with the fundamental principle of the
modern common law of torts. As to a considerable number of the accidents covered by
some of the recent statutes, the results reached under the statute would be absolutely
irreconcilable with results reached at common law in cases outside the scope of the
statute. This incongruity must inevitably provoke discussion as to the intrinsic
correctness of the common law of torts; and is likely to lead, either to a movement in
favor of repealing the statutes, or to a movement in favor of making radical changes in
the common law.P

What made these acts special? Why couldn't they be separated from
the general common law of torts and treated as their own special case?
Smith was, after all, perfectly comfortable with treating respondeat
superior and strict liability for extra-hazardous activities as special
cases. In one of his other writings, he shows himself very sympathetic

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id. at 255 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 256-57.
Id. at 257.
Id.
Id. at 235 (footnotes omitted).
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to the idea of identifying tort with fault and treating strict liability as
its own separate field. 34 Legal scholars were already arguing that the
strict liability principle of the Workmen's Compensation Acts should
be confined in just this way:
It is sometimes alleged that a Workmen's Compensation Act does not make any change
in the law of torts. Eminent jurists have said that "in strictness it stands outside the
law of torts altogether"; that it "is a law of compulsory insurance, and quite beyond the
region of actionable wrongs"; that it creates (or, in effect, is) "a statutory term of the
contract of service"; and that the liability thus created is "quasi-contractual" rather
than "delictual". Again, it is said: 'Itis not a regulation of any substantive duty, nor
does it change the substantive law or the duty of the employer in any way. It is
exclusively an economic readjustment of the burdens of industrial accident." It is "idle
to try to borrow tort analogies, either for or against this legislation." This legislation is
"not founded on tort, but is founded on the supposed economic shift of a burden from
shoulders which are believed unable to bear it, to the employer, who is supposed to be
better able to bear it and to be able to get back that cost from the public." Such
"compensation" is not "damages" nor meant in principle to be half damages. Neither is
it based upon the idea of a tort, or meant to be reparation for a wrong. In principle it is
the payment of the employer's share of a common undertaking.35

Why did Jeremiah Smith reject all of these ways of limiting the
general import of the Workmen's Compensation Acts? Here is what he
says:
But, notwithstanding these modes of characterizing this kind of legislation, two
stubborn facts remain. First: the statute imposes upon an employer a duty of
compensation, which did not exist under the modem common law of torts. The statute
shows "a distinct revulsion from the conception that fault is essential to liability." It is
"a distinct reversion to the earlier conceptions that he who causes harm, however
innocently, is, as its author, bound to make it good." This legislation "has taken a
wholly new departure as regards the cases within it." The magnitude of the change
thus effected and its radical nature have been recognized by many jurists.3 6

The repudiation of "fault!' as the basis of liability unifies the
Workmen's Compensation Acts in all their diverse statutory forms and
constitutes a radical challenge to the common law of torts:
The point to be made here is: that all these various forms of legislation (a direct
payment by employer to workman, or payment through an insurance fund; a
'compulsory' statute, or an 'elective' statute) are all alike intended to bring about one
and the same ultimate result; and all are alike based upon one and the same general
theory. They are all intended to accomplish a result entirely incongruous with that
which would be reached under the modern common law of torts. And they are all alike
based upon a theory (that fault is not requisite to liability) which is utterly inconsistent
with the fundamental principle of the modern common law of torts.3 7

34. See Jeremiah Smith, Tort and Absolute Liability: Suggested Changes in Classification,
30 HARV. L. REV. 241, 319, 409 (1917).
35. Smith, supra note 15, at 245 (footnotes omitted).
36. Id. at 245-46 (footnotes omitted).
37. Id. at 249-50 (footnote omitted).
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The Workmen's Compensation Acts, in short, cannot be cordoned off
from the general law of torts as some kind of special case because they
(1) reach results that conflict directly with those that the common law
of torts would reach but for the Acts, and (2) rest on a theory of
responsibility for accidental injury directly opposed to the theory on
which the common law of torts rests.
More is involved here than just rejecting fault liability and
embracing strict liability. The Workmen's Compensation Acts, Smith
believes, rest on a conception of fairness:
As to considerations of justice and expediency urged in support of the statute.... It is
argued that a part (at least) of the damage, happening to workmen in a business
without fault on the part of any one, should be borne by the owner of the business,
because the latter initiated the undertaking with a view to his own benefit, and
m
because he will reap the net profit of the business if any should accrueP

This passage expresses one half of the enterprise liability idea-the
idea that nonnegligent losses should be borne by the enterprise, the
actor whose activity precipitates them. The other half of the enterprise
liability idea holds that those who benefit from an enterprise's risky
activities should bear the burdens of its accidents. Employment
related accident costs should not remain concentrated on employers.
They should be dispersed across all those-owners, managers,
customers, suppliers, employees-who benefit from the imposition of
the enterprise's characteristic risks.
This enterprise liability idea of fairness condemns the common
law of torts, as it existed in Smith's time, because it suggests that
other domains of fault liability should also be supplanted by strict
liability. Fairness favors granting outsiders-strangers to an
enterprise-the benefits of strict liability even more than it favors
granting the benefits of strict liability to employees:
The employee is himself a part of the undertaking. He has, in one sense voluntarily
participated in it; and is deriving benefits from it. Whereas outsiders have nothing to
do with the undertaking. Frequently they "are exposed, without any choice on their
side, to more or less risk of injury arising from what is done in the conduct of it by the
owner or his servants." An outsider is not a participant in the business and "derives no
direct benefit from its carrying on."39

38. Id. at 252. Smith goes on to express some reservations about this argument, because
the argument seems to imply that only owners benefit from the operation of a business. He
expresses these reservations, in part, I think, because he does not see the second half of the idea
of fairness at work here, which calls for the dispersion of the costs of enterprise related accidents
across the enterprise, and hence across all those who benefit from its risk impositions. The
objection assumes that all accident costs will be shouldered by the employer. In fact, employersfirms-will shift much of the cost onto to suppliers, customers, shareholders and employees
themselves. See id.
39. Id. at 252-53 (footnote omitted).
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Strangers to an enterprise thus have an even stronger argument for
strict liability than employees do. Employees benefit directly from the
enterprises that injure them; strangers do not.
Fairness likewise favors granting the customers of an
enterprise the benefits of strict liability even more than it favors
granting those benefits to employees:
If it is just to grant partial compensation to a workman in the undertaking and also to
an outsider, why may not the claim of a paying customer of the business, who is
damaged without fault on the part of any one (e.g., a paying passenger in a trolley car)
stand on at least equally strong ground? The fares paid by passengers to the common
carrier in the trolley business constitute
the fund out of which the motorman is
4
compensated [in the event of injury]. 0

The rationale of the Workmen's Compensation Acts thus
suggests that the common law of torts is fundamentally mistaken.
Fault was a prerequisite to tort liability under the common law of
torts in the early twentieth century. Measured by the idea of fairness
that informs the Workers' Compensation Acts, however, fault liability

is less fair-less just-than strict liability. Jeremiah Smith, therefore,
concluded his paper with these thoughts:
At the outset [of this paper], it was assumed .. .that the basic principle of the
Workmen's Compensation Act is just ....
We have now attempted to show that, if justice to workmen requires such an
enactment, then justice to certain persons other than workmen must also require
similar legislation for their benefit; in other words, that the benefit of legislation on
this basic principle cannot justly be confined to workmen.
We have also attempted to show that, if the above propositions are correct, then the
common law of A.D. 1900 is wrong in principle and ought to be repudiated. 41

The "repudiation" of "the common law of A.D. 1900" could,
Smith thought, be effected by reformulating a handful of key
doctrines:
By a very liberal construction of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine; by a broad view of as to
what constitutes prima facie evidence of negligence; and by inverting the burden of
proof (putting on defendant the burden of proving that he was not negligent),-tho
court could go far towards practically reversing the common law of A.D. 1900 in a large
42
proportion of cases.

40. Id. at 253.
41. Id. at 367.
42. Id.
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2. The Fulfillment of Smith's Prophesies in the Common Law of
California
Smith's apocalyptic vision has not been fully realized, of course.
Fault liability is alive and well in the law of torts. The prescience of
Smith's vision, however, remains astonishing. Much of what he
prophesied came to pass in important parts of California's common
law of torts. Res ipsa has been reconfigured from a rule of negligence
liability into a de facto form of strict liability. Product users have
received the protections of enterprise liability in part because the
California Supreme Court concluded that customers had especially
strong claims to the protections of strict liability. Strangers to product
accidents have received the protections of enterprise liability in part
because the Court concluded that their failure to derive any benefit
from the enterprises whose products injured them made the fairness
argument in favor of granting them the benefits of enterprise liability
especially compelling. And when the California Supreme Court
tackled the thorny problem of making liability for design defect
stricter than ordinary negligence liability, it did so in part by
"inverting" the burden of proof-by shifting to defendants the burden
of proving that their products were not defectively designed. By the
end of the 1960s, enterprise liability had emerged as a conception of
responsibility for accidental injury as general as, and competitive
with, fault liability. By the end of the 1960s, Smith's insight that
enterprise liability required remaking the tort law of accidents was
being widely (if implicitly) acknowledged and widely acted upon by
courts.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was the first to fall in line with
Smith's prophecies. Thirty years after Smith observed that res ipsa
loquitur might be turned, by "liberal construction," from a rule of
negligence liability to a form of strict liability, Roger Traynor penned
his famous dissent in Escola v. Coca Cola,4 3 arguing that res ipsa
loquiturwas being construed so liberally that it had become "in reality
liability without negligence," 44 and that the courts should cease to
disguise that fact:
In leaving it to the jury to decide whether the inference of negligence has been
dispelled, regardless of the evidence against it, the negligence rule approaches the rule
of strict liability. It is needlessly circular to make negligence the basis of recovery and
impose what is in reality liability without negligence. If public policy demands that a

43. Escola v. Coca Cola, 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944).
44. Id. at 463.
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manufacturer of goods be responsible for their quality regardless of negligence there is
no reason not to fix that responsibility openly. 45

In 1963, in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products,46 Traynor wrote
for the majority and adopted the rationale of his Escola dissent,
rejecting both negligence liability and contract (warranty) liability,
and subjecting defective products to strict liability in tort. The
enterprise liability character of his position could not have been
clearer: "The purpose of such liability," Traynor wrote, "is to insure
that the costs of injuries resulting from defective products are borne
by the manufacturers that put such products on the market rather
than by the injured persons who are powerless to protect
47
themselves."
Products liability in Greenman is, in large part, 48 an instance of
strict liability in favor of customers. As such, it is the very kind of
extension of strict liability that the logic of the Workers'
Compensation Acts, in Smith's opinion, required. Indeed, Traynor's
arguments for the imposition of enterprise liability in Escola and
Greenman tracked the enterprise liability logic Smith had mapped
even more tightly than the extension of enterprise liability to
customers suggests. Traynor, like Smith before him, concluded that
customers are related to the firms whose products they consume in a
way that strengthens the case for imposing enterprise liability. In
Escola, Traynor asserts that technological progress has diminished
the customer's capacity to protect herself at the very same time that
sophisticated marketing strategies have induced consumers to let
down their guard. These two facts strengthen the case for subjecting
defective products to a rule of enterprise liability. 49
In Greenman, Traynor reiterates his arguments in Escola's and
adds a new argument: manufacturers assume special responsibility for
the safety of customers because products themselves implicitly

45. Id.
46. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).
47. Id. at 901.

48. "In large part," but not exclusively, because Greenman establishes strict liability in
favor of product users, and not all product users are purchasers of the product that injured thom.
See id. at 900-01.
49.
Manufacturing processes, frequently valuable secrets, are ordinarily eithor
inaccessible to or beyond the ken of the general public. The consumer no longer
has the means or skill enough to investigate for himself the soundness of a
product, even when it is not contained in a sealed package, and his erstwhilo
vigilance has been lulled by the steady efforts of manufacturers to build up
confidence by advertising and marketing devices such as trade-mark.
Escola, 150 P.2d at 467.
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represent that they will "safely do the jobs for -which [they are]
built."50 The California Supreme Court thus justified extending
enterprise liability to product purchasers in part because it came to
the same conclusion as Smith-that special features of the
relationship between firms and their customers made the case for
adopting enterprise liability even more compelling.
Neither the enterprise liability logic of Traynor's Greenman
opinion, nor the expansiveness of that logic, was lost on Traynor's
contemporaries. Hesitating to follow Traynor's lead, the Oregon
Supreme Court echoed Smith's fear that the logic of enterprise
liability called for the wholesale displacement of fault liability.
Enterprise liability gave the Oregon court pause precisely because it
was a general theory of responsibility for accidental injury, a theory
every bit as encompassing as the fault principle and competitive with
it. If enterprise liability was the correct form of liability for product
defects, it was also the correct form of liability in a wide range of other
cases:
Substantially the same reasons for imposing strict liability upon sellers of defective
chattels have been advanced in several other cases and in various texts and articles.
Summarized, the thesis is that a loss resulting from the use of the defendant's defective
goods is a "casualty produced by the hazards of defendant's enterprise, so that the risk
of loss is properly a risk of that enterprise," a view commonly described as the theory of
enterprise liability....
..The reasoning would seem to apply not only in cases involving personal injuries
arising from the sale of defective goods, but equally to any case where an injury results
from the risk creating conduct of the seller in any stage of the production and
distribution of goods .... It seems to us that the enterprise liability rationale employed
in the Escola case proves too much and that if adopted would compel us to apply the
principle of strict liability in all future cases where the loss could be distributed.5'
5 2 the
In the 1969 case, Elmore v. American Motors Corporation,
California Supreme Court extended strict products liability to
bystanders. In so doing, the court explicitly echoed Smith's point that
the case for extending strict liability to strangers to an enterprise is
even stronger than the case for extending strict liability to
participants in an enterprise:
If anything, bystanders should be entitled to greater protection than the consumer or
user where injury to bystanders from the defect is reasonably foreseeable. Consumers

50. Greennmn, 377 P.2d at 901.
51. Wights v. Staff Jennings, Inc., 405 P.2d 624 (Or. 1965) (emphasis in original, citing
EHRENZWEIG, NEGLIGENCE WITHOUT FAULT 4 (1951)); Fleming James, Jr., General ProductsShould Manufacturers be Liable Without Negligence?, 24 TENN. L REV. 923, 926 (1957). These
passages are excerpted in FRANKLIN & RABIN EDS. TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES 553 (6th ed.,
1996).
52. Elmore v. Am. Motors Corp., 451 P.2d 84 (CaL 1969).
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and users, at least, have the opportunity to inspect for defects and to limit their

purchases to articles manufactured by reputable manufacturers and sold by reputable
retailers, whereas the bystander ordinarily has no such opportunities. In short, the

bystander is in greater need of protection from defective products which are dangerous,
and if any distinction should be made between bystanders and users, it should be
made, contrary to the position of defendants, to extend greater liability in favor of

bystanders.5

Smith had made the same basic point, some fifty-five years earlier.
Strangers to an enterprise have a stronger claim to the protections of
strict liability than participants do because-unlike participantsstrangers neither choose to expose themselves to enterprise related
risks nor receive any direct benefits from their exposure to enterprise
54
related risks.
In 1978, when the California Supreme Court took up the
problem of articulating standards for determining when a product
design was defective, it bore out more of Smith's prophesy. Design
defects pose special problems for enterprise liability. Enterprise
liability-like all strict liability-requires attributing accidents to
activities. Product accidents arise at the intersection of several
activities. On the one hand, the paradigmatic victim of a product
related accident both purchases and uses the instrument of her injury,
thereby participating in the enterprise that injures her in two ways.
On the other hand, the firm whose product injures her typically
participates in the enterprise that issues an injury in two ways as
well. The product manufacturer usually designs and manufactures
the instrument of injury and markets and sells that instrument to the
victim. Matching accidents to activities is thus a challenging task, a
task which taxes the ingenuity of products liability law in its
enterprise liability incarnation. The particular problem of attribution
facing design defect law is to decide which product risks among those
plausibly attributable to product design should be treated as costs of
the manufacturer's activity, rather than as costs of the user's activity.
It will not do to count all accidents in which design features
play a prominent role as costs of the manufacturer's activity and to
attribute those accident costs to the manufacturer. It will not do, for
example, to charge all accidents attributable to the sharpness of steak
knives to the manufacturers of those knives. Sharpness is the very
property that enables steak knives to serve their purpose. The
sharpness of a well-designed steak knife may precipitate an accident
that might otherwise have been avoided, but attributing all accidental

53. Id. at 89. Cf. Smith, supranote 34.
54. Id.
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injuries in which the sharpness of steak knives plays a prominent role
to the manufacturers of those knives will have perverse effects.
Building the costs of knife-related accidents into the costs of steak
knives will tend to favor careless over careful users by making the
careful pay for the harms the careless inflict on themselves. Worse yet,
if liability actually induces manufacturers to dull their knives, it will
seriously impair the product's utility. Sharpness is not a defect of a
steak knife. Accidents attributable to the sharpness of steak knives
should be counted as costs of the user's activity and left to lie where
they fall.
In other cases, however, it seems right to attribute an accident
to the product's design. When a passenger in an automobile suffers a
severe injury because the automobile manufacturer chose to design
the car with a soft, collapsible body frame rather than with a more
rigid one, the product manufacturer's design choice seems responsible
for the harm. 55 Unlike the sharpness of steak knives, the
crashworthiness of car frames is not essential to a car's usefulness. It
therefore seems wrong to attribute the harm to the user's activity and
right to attribute it to the producer's activity. The difficult task
confronting design defect law is to distinguish cases that are like the
sharpness of steak knives from cases that are like the crashworthiness
of car frames.
5 6 is the leading California case on
Barker v. Lull Engineering
product design defects.
Barker assumes an enterprise liability
framework for product liability law as a whole, and it addresses the
problem of devising design defect tests that sort injurer and victim
activity appropriately by adopting a twofold test of design defect.
Liability is imposed if a design fails to pass muster under either test.
One test-the expectation test-has its roots in contract (warranty)
law and measures defectiveness from the perspective of a product
consumer. This test is strict, not fault-based, because it imposes
liability on products whose designs disappoint consumer expectations,
even if those designs are, from a fault perspective, reasonable.5 7 The
second test-the risk-utility test-sounds in negligence. It is, however,
stricter than ordinary negligence liability in two ways. First, it judges
design defectiveness in light of knowledge available at trial and not,
as negligence liability does, in light of knowledge available or

55. This design feature was at issue in Dawson v. Chrysler Corp., 630 F.2d 950, 954 (3d Cir.
1980).
56. Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978).

57. For a clear example ofa design that disappoints reasonable consumer expectations even
though it passes muster under risk-utility (a negligence) test, see Denny v. FordMotor Co., 662
N.E.2d 730 (N. Y. 1995).
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reasonably obtainable at the time the product was sold. Second, it
relaxes the requirements of plaintiffs prima facie case and makes
defendants bear the burden of proving that a challenged design is not
defective.
Under Barker, plaintiffs are not required to identify the
"untaken precaution"-the alternative, feasible design-that would
have prevented the injury at issue and then make out a prima facie
case that this alternative feasible design is superior to the actual
design of the product. Under Barker, plaintiffs are required to show
only that the product's design played an important causal role in the
genesis of their injuries. "[O]nce the plaintiff makes a prima facie
showing that the injury was proximately caused by the defendant's
design, the burden... shift[s] to the defendant to prove, in light of the
relevant factors, that the product is not defective."5 8 Barker, in short,
dispenses with the "untaken precaution" requirement that is the core
of the traditional prima facie case of negligence and places on the
defendant the burden of proving that the product design at issue
passes muster under the risk-utility test.59
Barker's modifications of the risk-utility test are important. By
judging design defect with hindsight not foresight, by relaxing the
plaintiffs prima facie case, and by shifting the burden of proving that
the product's design meets the risk-utility test, Barker effects a form
of liability substantially stricter than ordinary negligence, even
though it speaks the negligence language of the risk-utility test. The
last two of the doctrinal devices that it uses-relaxing the plaintiffs
prima facie case and shifting the burden of proof to the defendantare devices that Jeremiah Smith anticipated. By taking "a broad view
of as to what constitutes prima facie evidence of negligence;" and "by
inverting the burden of proof," courts could, Smith wrote, convert
ordinary negligence liability into something much stricter.6 0 Without
citing Smith, the California Supreme Court pays tribute in Barker to
the accuracy of his insight.

58. Barker, 573 P.2d at 431. The court adds "the defendant's burden is one affecting the
burden of proof, rather than simply the burden of producing evidence." Id. at 455. By permitting
"the imposition of liability under strict liability principles if, upon hindsight, the trier of fact
concludes that the produces design is unsafe to consumers, users, or bystanders." Id. at 457.
Barker takes another step towards the strict liabflity that Smith foresaw.
59. This requirement, along with the use of foresight, not hindsight, to measure the
adequacy of the design at issue is insisted upon by the Restatement Third: ProductsLiabilities
test of design defect. The contrast between the Restatement Third's defect tests and the Barker
tests is a contrast between a pure form of negligence liability and a form of stricter liability
which incorporates elements of negligence balancing.
60. Smith, supra note 15, at 367.
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The prescience of Jeremiah Smith's predictions is evidence that
this committed advocate of fault liability saw deeply into the logic and
power of enterprise liability. First, Smith saw that the appearance of
the Workers' Compensation Acts introduced a deep conflict into the
law of accidents. The strict liability of the Workers' Compensation
Acts could not be dismissed either as a special case or as an historical
anomaly. On the contrary, the Workers' Compensation Acts embodied
a fully general principle of responsibility-the enterprise liability
principle-which was competitive with the fault principle. The Acts
thereby precipitated a conflict between two general but competitive
principles of responsibility for accidental injury. Second, Smith saw
that the logic of enterprise liability was powerfully expansive. If
workers had a just claim to the benefits of enterprise liability, so too
did customers and strangers. Third, Smith saw that the common law
of torts might well be reconstructed by the logic of enterprise liability.
That reconstruction could be effected as much by reworking negligence
liability as by imposing strict liability outright.
Most importantly, however, the prescience of Jeremiah Smith's
prophesies is powerful evidence that enterprise liability did enter the
common law of torts in the twentieth century, exerting considerable
influence over its contours.
B. Young B. Smith: the Theory of Workers' Compensationand the
Doctrine of Respondeat Superior
Young B. Smith's Frolicand Detour6 ' looks, at first glance, far
removed from the domain of Workers' compensation law. The paper's
principal topic is the interpretation of the "frolic and detour" doctrine
in the law of vicarious liability. Its account of respondeat superior
begins by concurring with Jeremiah Smith's argument that respondeat
superior doctrine itself lacks general significance. This first
appearance, though, is deceptive. The article represents a second
stage in the rise of enterprise liability. Frolic and Detour takes the
theory of enterprise liability and uses it to reconceptualize the law of
vicarious liability.
Jeremiah Smith had written that the law of vicarious liability
was not "a doctrine to be extended by analogy."622 It was, instead, an
historical curiosity. On the one hand, the doctrine was firmly
entrenched, too firmly entrenched to be uprooted by the fault
principle, no matter how dominant that principle might be. On the

61. Id. at 716.
62. Id. at 257.
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other hand, no convincing justification for the doctrine could be found
or fashioned. Respondeat superior could not serve, therefore, as the
basis for any coherent theory of strict liability capable of contesting
the supremacy of the fault principle. On these two points, Young B.
Smith appeared to agree with Jeremiah Smith:
No legal doctrine has been so generally criticized and yet so generally adhered to by
courts as the doctrine of respondeat superior.Not only is it now irretrievably rooted in

the law of the English speaking countries but it also exists to some extent in the law of
Scotland, France, Italy, Germany, Spain, Portugal, Switzerland and other countries

Is there any rational justification for the doctrine?
If one turns to the opinions of judges or books upon the subject, seeking a justification,
disappointment is almost inevitable. True it is that many reasons have been given, but

none of them are satisfying. Perhaps this may account for the fact that most legal
scholars who have written about the doctrine have disapproved of it; or, it may be that
the cause is deeper than this.

Our tort law as it has developed during the past four hundred years does not, in the
main, impose liability without fault. In this respect the law undoubtedly reflects the
common current of thought which has prevailed during this period ....
[Because it
makes fault essential to liability that current of thought it] is opposed to the
fundamental theory of agency [embodied by the doctrine of respondeatsuperior],3

The fact that vicarious liability was so deeply entrenched in
this and other countries suggested to Young B. Smith, however, that
there might be something wrong with the then current, fault-based,
disdain for it.64 It suggested, in fact, that vicarious liability might rest
on a general conception of responsibility, albeit one competitive with
the fault principle. Repondeat superior, Smith wrote, might be "the
forerunner of a different way, perhaps a more intelligent way" of
assigning responsibility for accidental injuries. 65
This "different . . . more intelligent" way of dealing with

inevitable injuries to third persons occasioned by servants pursuing
their master's business is to hold the master liable for those injuries
without regard to fault, and then to distribute the cost of the injuries
across the master's enterprise. The enterprise liability rationale of the

63. Id., Smith, supra note 16, at 452-53, 454 (quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Agency, 5
HARV. L. REV. 1, 14 (1891), in part).
64. Smith wrote, 'This phenomenon alone [the widespread entrenchment of the principle of

respondeat superior] suggests that there is, perhaps, more justification for the doctrine than its
critics have perceived." Id. at 453.

65. "It is not inconceivable," Smith explains, "that respondeatsuperioris but the forerunner
of a different way, perhaps a more intelligent way of dealing with a social problem. Tho
widespread enactment in recent times of workmen's compensation laws and similar statutes
points in this direction." Id.
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Workers' Compensation Acts, in short, supplied the justification that
the doctrine of respondeatsuperiorso sorely needed:
Why, then, should the master be responsible?
A reason which occurs to the writer is that which has been offered in justification of
workmen's compensation statutes. In substance it is the belief that it is socially more
expedient to spread or distribute among a large group of the community the losses
which experience has taught are inevitable in the carrying on of industry, than to cast
the loss upon a few.
A workman's leg is broken. If the master is not responsible, the loss falls on the
workman alone. He has no way of spreading it or passing it on either wholly or in part.
On the other hand if the master is made responsible he does not bear the loss alone
because he is in a position to spread the loss among employers of his class and include
his proportionate part in the cost of production. The employer may spread the loss
among employers of his class by carrying insurance to cover his liability, and his part
of the burden is represented by the amount of the insurance premium which is
relatively small By slightly enhancing the price of his product he can thus distribute
his part of losses occurring in his line of industry among the consumers. The net result
is that the losses occasioned by injuries to employees engaged in industry generally are
spread and distributed among a large number of the community.
If it is socially expedient to spread and distribute throughout the community the
inevitable losses occasioned by injuries to employees engaged in industry, is it not also
socially expedient to spread and distribute the losses due to injuries to third persons
which are equally inevitable? Surprising as it may seem, by means of the doctrine of
respondeatsuperiorthe common law has partially accomplished in the latter case what
workmen's compensation statutes have accomplished in the former.P

When respondeat superior is viewed through an enterprise liability
lens, it is a logical complement to Workers' Compensation law. "MI]he
justification for one [is] a justification for the other."67 Absent any
general theory of strict liability, respondeat superior is a derelict
doctrine. Find the right general theory, though, and the doctrine falls
into place. The Workers' Compensation Acts provided that theory,
because they brought the idea of enterprise responsibility for
accidental injury into the law. Respondeat superiorcould be then seen
as the common-law locus of that theory of responsibility. It was strict

in nature. It was poorly justified by the fault principle. And it
extended the reach of enterprise liability, because it held enterprises
accountable for the injuries that their agents tortiously inflicted on
persons unconnected to the enterprise in the course of carrying out the
enterprise's business.
By supplying vicarious liability law with a convincing
justification, Smith was also able to devise a solution to the specific

66. Id. at 456-57 (footnotes omitted).
67. Id. at 457 n.39.
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problem that troubled him-the interpretation of "frolic and detour"
doctrine. 68 "[F]rolic and detour" doctrine was in disarray, Smith

argued, because courts had been unable to come up with a compelling
rationale for respondeat superior.
... [I]t would seem proper to suggest that the way in which a rule is applied depends
more or less upon what the particular court conceives to be the reason for the rule. If a
court doubts the wisdom of a rule, a narrow and restricted application is to be expected.
On the other hand if the court approves the policy underlying a rule, a broad and
liberal application generally follows. Then again, if the court entertains no convictions
about a rule, a more or less mechanical application ensues, often leading to
inconsistencies and confusion.
The rule of respondeat superior has been applied by courts of all three classes. One
should not expect, therefore, to be able to harmonize all of the decisions involving the
responsibility of the master for his servants unauthorized torts. However ....
if some
common understanding can be reached as to what is the supposed object and
justification of the rule, there will be greater uniformity in its application, or at least
more intelligent disagreement, than has heretofore been the case.

Reconceiving respondeat superior doctrine in light of the
enterprise liability rationale of the Workers' Compensation Act leads
to a distinctive interpretation of the scope of the employer's liability. If
the justification for the doctrine is "the desire to include in the costs of
operation inevitable losses to third persons incident to carrying on an
enterprise, and thus distribute the burden among those benefited by
the enterprise,"70 then the scope of liability should turn not upon the
motives or intentions of the servant, but upon whether the conduct of
the business tends to expose third parties to the kind of risk that
issued in the injury at hand. Liability, in other words, should depend
on whether the enterprise increases the risk of the injury that
occurred sufficiently that the injury may be said to be "characteristic"
of the enterprise. For example:
[lit may be argued that it is a matter of common knowledge that servants employed to
drive automobiles frequently do make short excursions on errands of their own which
they would not have made but for the fact that they had been sent on an errand for the
master. Such conduct on the part of servants must, therefore, be regarded as a
probable result of employing servants to drive automobiles: just as probable as that
they will drive at a reckless speed. Accordingly the undertaking of an enterprise
involving the employment of chauffeurs must necessarily expose third parties to a risk
of injury from such excursions as well as expressly authorized acts and should,
therefore, be borne by the enterprise which caused the risk.7 1

68. The problem, Smith complained, was that although "nine decades [had] elapsed ... the
law today is in about the same nebulous condition as in 1834 when Baron Parke" first
formulated the doctrine. Id. at 444.
69. Id. at 463.
70. Id. at 718.
71. Id. at 724.
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There is a general lesson latent in this example:
In deciding whether the master is responsible in a particular case, the court should
consider first, whether the conduct of the master's business was a contributing cause of
the servanes act... If not, the master is not liable. If so, the court should next inquire
whether, in view of what the servant was actually employed to do, it was probable that
he would do what he did, instead of inquiring into whether the particular act, when
separated from its setting was an act done in furtherance of the particular work the
servant was employed to do.72

This approach, Smith concluded, "will harmonize most of the deviation
73
cases."
Smith's argument is simple, but powerful. First, the doctrine of
respondeatsuperiorholds employers strictly liable for the torts of their
servants, committed within the scope of their employment. Second,
the doctrine is too important, and too entrenched, to be overruled or
dismissed as a mistake. Third, fault theorists have been unable either
to justify the doctrine or to devise general guidelines for interpreting
it. Fourth, by taking our cue from the Workers' Compensation Acts
and the theory of enterprise liability that informs them, we can make
sense of the doctrine-we can justify it and we can give it a principled
and coherent application. Fifth, taking our cue from the Workers'
Compensation Acts is a perfectly sensible thing to do because the
theory of those acts implies that the inevitable injuries an enterprise
inflicts on strangers are every bit as much costs of an enterprise's
business as are injuries to participants. If the former should be borne
as costs of an enterprise's business, without regard to fault, the latter
should be borne in the same way. Respondeat superior is thus not a
vestigial and anomalous doctrine, but a prescient and principled one.
Respondeat superior is the common law's discovery of enterprise
liability before its time. Like the Workers' Compensation Acts,
respondeat superiorrests on an enterprise conception of responsibility
for accidental injury---"on a deeply rooted sentiment that a business
enterprise cannot justly disclaim responsibility for accidents which
may be fairly said to be characteristic of its activities."7 4
One part of this bears further repetition. Smith's arguments
link a particular claim about the scope of vicarious liability to a
particular justification for the doctrine. Respondeat superior liability
is-and should be-liability for the "characteristic risks" of an activity.
The justification for enterprise liability is "the desire to include in the
costs of operation inevitable losses to third persons incident to

72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 398 F.2d 167, 171 (2d Cir. 1968) (Friendly,
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carrying on an enterprise, and thus distribute the burden among those
benefitted by the enterprise." 75 The scope of vicarious liability,
therefore, should turn not upon the motives or intentions of the
servant, but upon whether the conduct of the business tends to expose
third parties to the kind of risk that materialized in injury in the case
at hand. Liability, in short, should turn on whether the risk at issue is
"characteristic" of the enterprise involved.
When courts and
commentators describe strict liability as liability for "characteristic
risk," they are thus embracing, implicitly or explicitly, an enterprise
conception of strict liability. The Restatement (Third): General
Principles' acknowledgment
that strict liability is liability for
76
"characteristic risk"

is thus a tacit recognition of enterprise liability's

influence on common law strict liability.
C. Guido Calabresi:Workers' Compensationand the Theory of
EnterpriseLiability
Guido Calabresi's name is identified with enterprise liability
more, perhaps, than any other name in modern torts scholarship.
When Calabresi first sketched his theory, he took the connections
among enterprise liability, workers' compensation, and respondeat
superior for granted. He used these doctrines and the theory that
linked them as the cornerstone on which he built both his own theory
of enterprise liability and his account of other forms of common law
strict liability. Risk Distributionin the Law of Torts77 thus illustrates

another stage in the rise of enterprise liability, a stage in which the
theory of enterprise liability radiates out from the Workers'
Compensation Acts and the doctrine of respondeat superior to become
an ambitious general theory of responsibility for accidental injury.
Calabresi's paper confirms the lessons of Jeremiah and Young
B. Smith because it, too, takes the Workers' Compensation Acts to be
the initial locus of enterprise liability and respondeat superior to be
the principal common law site of the conception. Yet, Risk Distribution
in the Law of Torts also complicates and enriches our understanding of
enterprise liability's relation to common law strict liabilities because
its common law reach is more ambitious. Jeremiah Smith had
confined himself to showing (1) that the enterprise liability theory of
the Workers' Compensation Acts was at odds with the fault liability of

75. Smith, supranote 16, at 718.
76. See infra text accompanying note 3.
77. Calabresi, supra note 4.
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the common law of torts, and (2) that the inconsistency would likely
lead to a resurgence of strict liability in tort. Young B. Smith had
confined himself to showing (1) the very theory of enterprise liability
that justified the Workers' Compensation Acts was also capable of
justifying respondeat superior doctrine, and (2) that extending
enterprise liability in this way supplied a better justification for, and
interpretation of, the doctrine of respondeat superior than any
justification that the fault theorists had been able to devise.
Calabresi's enterprise is more ambitious. He sets out to see
just how far common law strict liability can be understood to express
enterprise liability ideas as he conceives them. His work enriches our
understanding of enterprise liability's relation to common law strict
liabilities both because it shows that enterprise liability ideas provide
compelling justification for aspects of those liabilities and because it
shows that common law strict liabilities express enterprise liability
ideas imperfectly at best. On the one hand, these imperfections are
grist for enterprise liability's mill. The drive to eliminate them gives
enterprise liability its transformative power, its capacity to remake
the common law in the manner prophesied by Jeremiah Smith. On the
other hand, the inconsistencies between what enterprise liability calls
for and what the common law actually achieves underscore common
law resistance to enterprise liability ideas.
Our common law of torts is torn among competing conceptions
of responsibility for accidental injury, and enterprise liability is only
one of those conceptions. Fault liability is, of course, its principal
competitor, but not its only competitor. Enterprise liability ideas are
sometimes compromised not by the competing claims of fault liability
but by competition from other norms such as property rights. It would
be a grave mistake, however, to think that this shows that common
law strict liabilities do not, in fact, express enterprise liability ideas.
What it shows is that our common law of torts is torn both between
competing principles of responsibility and between competing
justifications for those principles. What it shows is that our tort law of
accidents must be understood not as the expression of one form of
liability to the exclusion of the other but as the expression of conflict
between these forms of liability and the justifications that can be
advanced for them.
Calabresi's assumption that Workers' Compensation law is the
canonical instance of enterprise liability crops up on the second page
of his paper. In the first sentence of a section summarizing enterprise
liability he writes:
"Activities should bear the costs they engender"; "itis only fair that an industry should
pay for the injuries it causes. "Enterprise liability"-the notion that losses should be
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borne by the doer, the enterprise,
rather than distributed on the basis of fault-is
78
usually explained in such terms.

In the first clause of the footnote supporting this claim, Calabresi also
cites to and quotes from Harper & James torts treatise: "The basic
philosophy of [the Workers' Compensation Acts] is that [accidental
injuries are] a cost of the enterprises that entail them, and should be
borne by the enterprises or their beneficiaries."7 9
When Calabresi takes up the use of the theory of enterprise
liability to interpret the doctrine of respondeat superior, he begins by
noting that tort scholars have long recognized the unity of Workers'
Compensation and respondeatsuperior:
Respondeat superior-like workmen's compensation, to which it has often been
analogized-was the forerunner of modern enterprise liability. As a result, both have
been written about extensively, though usually with emphasis only on their "loss
spreading" or "deep pocket' potentials. Both are based on the notion that no single
employee deems the risk of injury arising out of his employment to be great enough to
justify him either in insuring or in asking substantially higher wages because of it. The
proposition is an empirical one which can be fairly readily accepted. Respondeat
superior applies it to injuries to third parties, while workmen's compensation applies it
to the worker himself.80

The principal significance of Calabresi's paper, however, lies in
its extension of an economic account of enterprise liability theory to
common law forms of strict liability other than vicarious liability.
Calabresi undertakes a detailed discussion of existing areas of
common law strict liability, setting out to see just how far his
conception can explain and justify existing areas of common law strict
liability and just how well the common law fares in light of his theory
of enterprise liability.8 ' He begins by investigating nuisance law, an
intricate and perplexing mix of fault and nonfault liabilities. Here, he
finds that his theory's explanatory concepts-allocative efficiency and
loss distribution-fit poorly with certain doctrines, but well with
others. The fact that nuisances are sometimes enjoined, for example,
is a doctrinal detail which fits poorly with allocative efficiency and
loss-spreading rationales. Allocative efficiency cannot explain the
enjoinment of nuisances because:

78. Id. at 500.
79. Id. (quoting 2 FOWLERV. HARPER & FLEMING JAMES, JR., TORTS 731 (1956)).
80. Id. at 543 (citing CHARLES 0. GREGORY & HARRY KALVEN JR., CASES ON TORTS 703-25
(1959) (collecting authorities) in support of the assertion that both worker's compensation and
respondeatsuperiorhad "been written about extensively") (other citations omitted).
81. See id. at 534-53. Even the choice of areas to discuss seems theory dependent.
Calabresi is, presumably, attracted to common law strict liability precisely because he believes in
enterprise liability.
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In the modern view enjoinability depends on the damage the nuisance causes compared
to the cost of eliminating the nuisance, taking into account, however, the social benefits
of the activity which causes the nuisance. Were courts to apply a pure "economists"
allocation-of resources theory they would not go through all this rigamarole. They
would charge the nuisance with the damages it caused and, if the nuisance could pay
them and still stay in business, they would take this as a good "marketplace" indication
that the benefits to be derived from the activity were sufficiently great to justify its
existence. If it could not stay in business the same effect would be achieved as when a
nuisance is enjoined.82

Allocative efficiency, in short, would be better served by pricing the
damage caused by the nuisance and by letting the market determine if
the activity's social benefits outweigh its costs.
Loss spreading, if anything, fares worse. From a loss spreading
perspective, the issuance of injunctions is likely to make things worse,
not better:
Nor can a general justification for injunctions be found in loss spreading theory. If a
nuisance affected a relatively wide area it would be hard to see how enjoining that
nuisance could have a beneficial loss spreading effect. Indeed, in most cases injunction
would seem to invite relative concentration of losses and, hence, undesirable secondary
effects. If a nuisance affected only a limited number of people-and risk spreading was,
therefore, indifferent to, or possibly even favored protecting the injured few-damages
would be quite adequate to achieve the desired result with less risk of avoidable
secondary effects. For damages would be less likely to force a company out of business;
then, too, they could, in part, be spread to consumers through price changesP

The availability of injunctive relief must, therefore, be
explained in ad hoc terms. Injunctions express the force of property
rights; they do not reflect the general rationales of enterprise liability
as Calabresi conceives them, but rather the particular stringency of
special considerations applicable in this context. I In short, just as the
whole of respondeat superior doctrine is, for fault theorists, an
anomalous special case governed by other principles, this much
smaller detail of nuisance law is an anomalous special case for
Calabresi's conception of enterprise liability. The availability of
injunctive relief in nuisance law is special for the same reason that
respondeatsuperioris anomalous in the eyes of fault theorists. Just as
respondeat superior cannot be seen as an application of the fault
principle, so too the availability of injunctive relief in nuisance law
cannot be seen as an application of enterprise liability principles. The

82. Id. at 534-35 (footnote omitted).
83. Id.
84. "Ultimately, I suppose, this analysis suggests that ... other important factors may
require injunctions in cases in which 'loss distribution' theories would not ....For example, the
concept that private property is sacred and that the right to expropriate with compensation is a
right that ought normally to be given only to the state and not be made available to any neighbor
who wishes to manufacture rubber tires." Id. at 536 (footnote omitted).
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availability of injunctive relief is grounded in property rights, not in
policies of allocative efficiency and loss-spreading.
Enterprise liability is more in line with other aspects of
nuisance law, however. For example, Calabresi's conception of
enterprise liability can explain the requirements that (1) when a
nuisance is not enjoinable, the substantiality of the injury to the
plaintiff must be taken into account in order to establish the existence
of a nuisance and to justify the award of any damages and (2) the
"usefulness" of the nuisance causing enterprise must be weighed
before deciding if any nuisance exists:
The requirement of substantial injury is of course, justified in terms of loss spreading.
If the costs of a nuisance are spread quite thin, by hypothesis excellent loss-spreading
is achieved, and secondary effects are much less likely than where a firm is required to
pay damages. "Substantial injury" is also justified by resource-allocation theory
because of the high cost of justice . . . if the cost of requiring payments for small
damages were greater than the benefits strict allocation of resources would bring, there
would be no advantage in forcing such payments.8 5

"It is a little more difficult to find a justification for weighing the social
utility of an activity before determining whether it should pay
'nuisance' damages in those cases in which the harm caused by the
nuisance was substantial. "8 6 In the end, however, loss-spreading
considerations are the only ones that can justify this requirement, to
the extent that it can be justified:
Unless the injuries to any individual were extremely large, courts might well hesitate
to saddle an important enterprise with heavy damages. For damages might cause
disruption in the industry, or perhaps even a closing down, with disastrous secondary
consequences. [Thus] although allocation of resources might require the closing down of
87
a firm, ensuing disruptions would be too great to justify the change.

Calabresi goes on to criticize the breadth of existing nuisance case law
refusing relief on the ground that enterprise causing the nuisance is
useful. Case law refuses relief too broadly. Relief should be granted
against socially useful enterprises in those cases where the application
of nuisance law would only involve "higher prices" in the long run
rather that a "disaster to the industry."8 8 So Calabresi's principled
justification for the 'no damage doctrine' also functions to limit the
scope of that doctrine, thereby allowing the general enterprise liability
precept that "activities should bear their characteristic costs" to assert
itself more fully.8 9

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at 537 (footnotes omitted).
Id.
Id. at 539 (footnote omitted).
Id.
Id.
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The situation with respect to extra-hazardous activity liability
activity is similar. On the one hand, the theory of enterprise liability
can explain-on both allocation of risk and loss-spreading groundswhy extra-hazardous risk liability, unlike nuisance liability, does not
contain a "substantial damage" requirement:
On the basis of strict resource-allocation theory, industries should be liable for all their
costs, large or smalL Convenience, however, requires an exception in nuisance cases;
the expense of meeting small damages is too great for the benefits derived. Besides,
risk spreading is favored by letting small losses lie where they fall. This exception
seems much less necessary in extra-hazardous activity cases, since a series of costly
suits for minor damage is quite unlikely in these situations. The typical extrahazardous activity is one in which a substantial chance of substantial damage exists
...
If however, activities such as driving were suddenly termed extra-hazardous
activities, it would be highly likely that a requirement of substantial damage--similar
to that existing in nuisances-would be required. Otherivse the game would not be
worth the candle.90

On the other hand, extra-hazardous activity liability has not

expanded as far as enterprise liability theory suggests that it should.
Indeed, the policies underlying enterprise liability, as Calabresi
conceives it, are highly critical of the narrow scope of the existing

doctrine.

For

example,

extra-hazardous

activities

must

occur

"frequently" and not be a matter of "common usage." The logic of
enterprise liability favors restricting the "frequency' rule and
sweeping away with the doctrine of common usage:
The "frequency" rule may find some support in alloation-of resources theory but it
runs quite counter to loss-spreading notions. And the "common usage" notion runs
counter to both. Thus, the argument can be made that if the expected loss, though
significant to the party injured, occurs relatively infrequently, any readjustment of
resources
which would result from allocation of loss to the industry which caused it
would be minimal- ... On the other hand, the very fact that little readjustment would
be required to meet the loss if it were placed on the enterprise suggests the strongest
loss-spreading reason for liability since, by hypothesis, the loss was quite heavy when
placed on the person injured.
It is clear, then, that the notion of extra-hazardous activities has not been brought to
its logical conclusion in terms of risk-distribution theories . . . . Continuation of a
narrow definition of extra-hazardous activities must necessarily find what justification
it has in factors outside the scope of this article.31

Calabresi's theory of enterprise liability thus functions as a

two-edged sword. On the one hand, the theory can explain important
aspects of existing "extra-hazardous" activity liability doctrine. On the
other hand, the theory is deeply critical of that doctrine because it has
yet to take enterprise liability ideas to their 'logical conclusion."
Enterprise liability remains, as it was in Jeremiah Smith's time,

90. Id. at 541-42.
91. Id. at 542-43 (footnotes omitted).
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powerfully critical of existing tort doctrine. Turn it loose and it will
transform the law of torts.
The double-edged character of enterprise liability reappears in
Calabresi's discussion of respondeat superior and workmen's
compensation. Considerations of allocative efficiency-the advantages
of including in the price of every good and service the accident costs
occasioned by its production-justify the "scope of employment"
restrictions found in these doctrines:
Proper resource allocation militates strongly against allocating to an enterprise costs

not closely associated with it--'liability should be limited to injuries arising out of or in
the course of employment." But it also militates for allocating to an enterprise all costs
that are within the scope of that enterprise. "The enterprise is held liable even though
no fault on its part can be shown." Not charging an enterprise with a cost which arises
from it leads to an understatement of the true cost of producing its goods; the result is
that people purchase more of those goods than they would want if their true cost were

reflected in price. On the other hand, placing a cost not related to the scope of an
enterprise on that enterprise results in an overstatement of the cost of those goods, and
leads to their underproduction. 92

So, Calabresi's theory can explain and justify both the
strictness of Workers' compensation and respondeat superior liability
and their confinement of all liability to injuries connected to the
tortfeasor's employment. Yet, Calabresi's theory cannot explain or
justify the fact that the master's liability is, for the most part, confined
to injuries occasioned by the "faulty" conduct of its servants. This
failure of explanation is an instance of the general inability of
enterprise liability ideas to explain "why tort liability generally
retains a semi-fault basis. The answer [to that question] must be
found in the broad justification for the fault requirement. The
inconsistency between these limitations based on fault and the
philosophy of the workmen's compensation was long ago noted. It still
93
remains."
On the one hand, then, respondeat superior gives powerful
expression to enterprise liability ideas. On the other hand, it does not
fully realize those ideas. This happens, in part, because the enterprise
liability principle contends with the fault principle for control of the
law of torts. Tort doctrine reflects the contest between these two
competing general conceptions of responsibility. Fault considerations
seep into enterprise liability doctrines and enterprise liability
conceptions seep into fault doctrines. 94

92. Id.at 514.
93. Id. at 545 (citing Smith, supranote 15, at 344).
94. On the latter point, see infra Part III.
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Calabresi's application of his own theory of enterprise liability
to nuisance law, ultra-hazardous activity liability and respondeat
superior is important to us for a number of reasons. First, it shows
enterprise liability theory being extended even further: The scholarly
march of enterprise liability from Jeremiah Smith to Young B. Smith
to Guido Calabresi is a march from Workers' compensation to
respondeat superior to all of common law strict liability. Second,
Calabresi's encounters with the doctrinal details of common law strict
liability tell us much about how general theory shapes doctrine.
Enterprise liability and fault liability treat the very same doctrines
differently. Where one sees principle, the other sees exception. Where
one sees something to criticize and contain, the other sees something
to praise and expand. How we interpret black-letter legal doctrinewhat we take to be general and justifiable and what we take to be
anomalous and exceptional-depends, to an extraordinary degree, on
the conception of responsibility to which we subscribe. Both fault and
enterprise conceptions of liability are embedded in our law. If we take
enterprise liability to be the superior conception, we will favor strict
doctrines over fault ones, and we will tend to interpret fault doctrines
narrowly and strict ones expensively. If we take fault liability to be
the superior conception, we will favor fault doctrines over strict ones
and we will tend to interpret strict doctrines narrowly and fault
doctrines expansively. Our accounts of respondeat superior,nuisance
law, and abnormally dangerous activity liability will turn out to be
drastically different.
More generally, Calabresi's theory is capable of unifying,
justifying and explaining many disparate fields of strict liability-but
not perfectly. It cannot accommodate every detail of every doctrine,
and it cannot explain the enormous continuing influence of fault
liability. So it both fits the law of torts in substantial part and calls for
its reconstruction in substantial part. In this respect, Calabresi's
theory comes remarkably close to being a mirror image of the general
theories of torts fashioned by fault theorists. 95 In those theories, fault
doctrines express the correct general principle of responsibility for
accidental injury, while strict doctrines are the exception. While
Calabresi-like Young B. Smith before him-is inclined to
characterize non-enterprise liability doctrines as special cases,ss or as

95. In his later book, The Costs of Accidents, for example, Calabresi criticizes the fault
system on the ground that it fares poorly as a mechanism for realizing enterprise liability ends.
See CALABRESI, COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 8,at 239-87 (C[F]aultis not a good system ...
it is a very poor system of loss spreading.").
96. Recall Calabresi's discussion of the availability of injunctive relief in nuisance cases, a
phenomenon which he attributes "to the concept that private property is sacred and that the
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expressions of a now obsolete "19th century Weltanschauung,"9 7 fault
theorists are inclined to characterize strict doctrines as (1) the
expression of even more outdated, pre-modern conceptions of
responsibility, or (2) special cases either explicable by accidents of
history, or (3) special circumstances where fault ideas lead to strict
98
doctrines.
What are we to make of the fact that fault and enterprise
liability theorists give very different accounts of the same body of law,
reversing general principle and exception? Three tentative
generalizations suggest themselves. The first is that both enterprise
liability theorists and fault theorists are able to show that large parts,
but not all, of the law of accidents can be squared with their preferred
conception of responsibility. Proponents of each principle must
contend with anomalous and exceptional doctrines. Each side can give
powerful and convincing justifications of some doctrines and less
convincing justifications for others. Unsurprisingly, the justifications
that each side gives for its preferred principle are more compelling
than the justifications it gives for its disfavored doctrine. Each camp
can "fit and justify" central features of tort doctrine, but neither camp
can make sense of and justify all tort doctrines more persuasively than
its competitor. 99
The second lesson is an extension of the first. Enterprise
liability theorists like Young B. Smith and Guido Calabresi explain
and justify strict liability very powerfully-far more powerfully, in my
view, than fault theorists like Jeremiah Smith or Richard Posner do.
Young B. Smith and Calabresi provide unity and justification to

right to expropriate with compensation is a right that ought normally to be given only to the
state and not be made available to any neighbor who wishes to manufacture rubber tires." See
Calabresi, supra note 4.
97. See Calabresi, supra note 4, at 515-17, 538. The quoted phrase occurs on page 515.
Young B. Smith expresses this criticism of fault liability implicitly, when he describes respondeat
superioras "the forerunner of a different way, perhaps a more intelligent way of dealing with a
social problem .... " Smith, supra note 16.

98. The classic statement of strict liability as the embodiment of an ancient and discredited
conception of responsibility is James B. Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HARV. L. REV. 92 (1928). The
Restatement Third- General Principles, itself takes the peculiar historical circumstances tack.

See supra note 3, and accompanying text. An excellent example of a fault theorist explaining
strict liability doctrine as a special application of fault conceptions is the discussion of respondeat
superiorin Richard Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972). Gary Schwartz,
the principal reporter for the Restatement Third-General Principlesendorses the same idea. See
Gary T. Schwartz, The Hidden and Fundamental Issue of Employer Vicarious Liability, 69 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1739, 1764-65 (1996). The idea that strict liability is sometimes justified for
administrative or evidentiary reasons is recurring them in fault theories.
99. For the importance of this idea, see generally Gregory C. Keating, Fidelity to Preexisting
Law and the Legitimacy of Legal Decision, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (1993).
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doctrines that Jeremiah Smith took-in the manner of most fault
theorists and the the Restatement (Third): General Principlesitselfto be either special cases or historically anomalous exceptions to the
fault liability. Young B. Smith and Guido Calabresi show that the
principal common law strict liability doctrines can be conceived of, in
large part, as expressions of the idea of enterprise liability embodied
by the Workers' Compensation Acts. They make a powerful case that
the disparate domains of common law strict liability can all be
understood as embodiments of the same general, nonfault principle of
responsibility.
The third lesson here is that the choice between fault and
enterprise justifications for strict liability doctrines is an important
one because it tends to shape the law. For fault theorists, negligence is
the expression of general principle, and strict liability is the exception.
For enterprise liability theorists, strict liability is the expression of
general principle, and fault is the exception. Fault theorists, therefore,
tend to confine strict doctrines and expand fault ones, whereas
enterprise liability theorists tend to expand strict doctrines and
confine fault ones.
II. THEORY IN CASES
Case rhetoric confirms the lessons of tort theory: opinions that
invoke enterprise liability ideas to justify strict doctrines tend to
interpret those doctrines more expansively than opinions that invoke
fault ideas to justify those doctrines.100 Taking the strictness of
abnormally dangerous activity liability to be an attempt to achieve
fault purposes leads to a relatively narrow interpretation of the scope
of abnormally dangerous activity liability doctrine. Conversely, taking
the strictness of respondeat superiors "scope of employment" rule to
100. Product liability cases might also be used to illustrate this point. Contrast, for example,
the defect regime that the California Supreme Court adopts in Barker with the defect regime
approved in the Restatement Third: Product Liability. The Barker regime, which expresses
enterprise liability ideas, adopts alternative defects tests, both of which are stricter than
ordinary negligence liability. Barker'sexpectation test is strict because liability under it does not
turn on the amount of care exercised by the product manufacturer. Barkefs risk-utility test is
stricter than the ordinary negligence test because it relaxes plaintiffs prima facie case, quickly
shifting the burden of proof to the defendant, and uses hindsight rather than foresight to
evaluate the adequacy of a product design. The Restatement 7hird regime for design defect, by
contrast, adopts only the risk-utility test and adopts a version of that test which makes it a
standard instance of negligence liability. The Restatenent Third's negligence test uses foresight
balancing and requires plaintiff to prove, as part of its prima facie case, the superiority of an
alternative feasible design in almost all cases. For an opinion explicitly rejecting the
RESTATEMENT THIRD'S negligence version of the risk-utility test because it is inconsistent with
enterprise liability ideas, see Brooks v. Beech Aircraft Corporation,902 P.2d 54 (N1. 1995).
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express enterprise liability ends leads to a relatively broad
interpretation of that doctrine's reach. Enterprise liability ideas
justify the imposition of vicarious liability even when fault objectives
would be better served by withholding liability. Consider the following
examples.
A. Abnormally DangerousActivity Liability
In a notable opinion, 1 1 Judge Posner expounds a fault
rationale for the strictness of abnormally dangerous activity liability.
Abnormally dangerous activity liability, Posner argues, pursues the
fault objective of reducing risk to its justified level through the special
mechanism of holding those engaged in abnormally dangerous
activities strictly liable, thereby inducing them not only to proceed
carefully each time they engage in those activities but also to engage
in those activities only at an appropriate level of intensity. Negligence
liability, by contrast, encourages prospective injurers to exercise due
care in conducting their activities, but it does not encourage
prospective injurers to conduct their activities at the justified level. 102
When the intensity with which an activity is carried on-not just the
carefulness with which it is conducted-is essential to attaining the
cost-justified level of risk imposition, fault liability's concern with
inducing the correct level of precaution calls for the adoption of a rule
of strict liability. When, for example, not only the carefulness, but also
the frequency, with which hazardous materials are transported
through densely populated areas matters to the attainment of the
justified level of risk reduction, strict liability is preferable to fault

liability.

103

101. Indiana Harbor Belt R.R. v. American Cyanamid Co., 916 F.2d 1174 (1990).
102. The distinction between "levels of care" and "levels of activity" originates in a seminal
article by Steven Shavell, Strict Liability versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1980).
103. In Posner's own words:
The baseline common law regime of tort liability is negligence. When it is a
workable regime, because the hazards of an activity can be avoided by being
careful (which is to say, nonnegligent), there is no need to switch to strict
liability. Sometimes, however, a particular type of accident cannot be prevented
by taking care but can be avoided, or its consequences minimized, by shifting the
activity in which the accident occurs to another locale, where the risk or harm of
an accident will be less, or by reducing the scale of the activity in order to
minimize the number of accidents caused by it .... By making the actor strictly
liable-by denying him in other words an excuse based on his inability to avoid
accidents by being more careful-we give him an incentive, missing in a
negligence regime, to experiment with methods of preventing accidents that
involve not greater exertions of care, assumed to be futile, but instead relocating,
changing, or reducing (perhaps to the vanishing point) the activity giving rise to
the accident.
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The fundamental aim of strict liability, so conceived, is the
fault aim of increased precaution. One distinctive aim of strict liability
as enterprise liability conceives it-the aim of distributing the costs of
an enterprise's inevitable accidents across those who benefit from the
enterprise-is absent. In Indiana Harbor Belt Railroad v. American
Cyanamid Co., Posner concluded that this fault aim did not justify
applying a rule of strict liability to the activity of transporting
acrylonitrile. 1°4 On the one hand, Posner opined, exercising reasonable
care would reduce the risk to an acceptable level; on the other hand,
imposing strict liability would not induce any desirable changes in
activity level. 105

Posner's opinion, with its fault justification for strict doctrine
and its refusal to impose strict liability where it will not (in Posner's
view) induce increased precaution, contrasts nicely with Siegler v.
Kuhlman,1 6 another notable abnormally dangerous activity liability
opinion. Siegler imposes strict liability on the transport of large
quantities of gasoline by tractor-trailer, notwithstanding the fact
"[t]hat gasoline cannot be practicably transported except upon the
public highways ...."o Why impose strict liability when it seems
unlikely to induce greater precaution, because it is impossible to
change the method by which gasoline is transported? The majority
opinion places primary reliance on the magnitude of the risk that
survives the exercise of reasonable care. Its appeal to enterprise

IndianaHarborBell R.R,,916 F.2d at 1177 (citations omitted).
104. Id.
105.
For all that appears from the record of the case or any other sources of
information that we have found, if a tank car is carefully maintained the danger
of a spill is negligible. If this is right, there is no compelling reason to move to a
regime of strict liability, especially one that might embrace all other hazardous
materials shipped by rail as well ....
The district court and the plaintiff's lawyer make much of the fact that the spill
occurred in a densely inhabited metropolitan area. Only 4,000 gallons spilled;
what if all 20,000 had done so? Isn't the risk that this might happen even if
everybody were careful sufficient to warrant giving the shipper an incentive to
explore alternative routes? Strict liability would supply that incentive. But this
argument overlooks the fact that, like other transportation networks, the railroad
network is a hub-and-spoke system. And the hubs are in metropolitan areas.
Chicago is one of the nation's largest railroad hubs. In 1983, the latest year for
which we have figures, Chicago's railroad yards handled the third highest volume
of hazardous material shipments in the nation . . . With most hazardous
chemicals (by volume of shipments) being at least as hazardous as acrylonitrile, it
is unlikely-and certainly not demonstrated by the plaintiff-that they can be
rerouted around all the metropolitan areas of the country, except at prohibitive
cost.
Id. at 1179-80.
106. Siegler v. Kuhlman, 502 P.2d 1181 (Wash. 1972).
107. Id.
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liability ideas-to the ideas that cost-internalization may stimulate
enterprises to push back the frontiers of reasonable precaution and
that the costs of nonnegligent accidents should be borne by the
enterprises whose accidents they are-remains just below the
surface. 0 8 The concurrence, however, brings those enterprise liability
rationales to the surface:
[A] good reason to apply [strict liability] principles, which is not mentioned in the
majority opinion, is that the commercial transporter can spread the loss among his

customers-who benefit from this extrahazardous use of the highways. Also, if the
defect which caused the substance to escape was one of manufacture, the owner is in
the best position to hold the manufacturer to account.10 9

The first part of this passage makes the classic enterprise
liability argument that strict liability will lead to a fairer distribution
of the burdens and benefits of accidental risk impositions. The last
sentence in the passage brings out a more subtle rationale for
enterprise liability, a rationale which has more to do with risk
reduction than with loss-distribution. Enterprise liability may induce
increased risk reduction even when activity level improvements are
not obvious to disinterested observers. Enterprise liability brings more
cost-pressure to bear on risky activities than negligence liability does
and places responsibility for risk reduction in the hands of the parties
who impose the risks at issue. Negligence, on the other hand, places
decisions about appropriate precaution in the hands of judges and
juries. If enterprises are generally the preeminent experts with
respect to the risks of their own activities, then strict liability places
responsibility for risk-reduction in the hands of those best able to
reduce risk and gives them maximal incentives to do so.110 When an
enterprise is composed of independent entities linked to one another
by a chain of contractual relationships, as the enterprise in Siegler is,
enterprise liability places responsibility for reducing risks in the
hands of those best situated to determine which independent entity
should be charged with responsibility for reducing some particular

108.
Transporting gasoline as freight by truck along the public highways and streets is

obviously an activity involving a high degree of risk; it is a risk of great harm and
injury; it creates dangers that cannot be eliminated by exercise of reasonable
care ....
Nor will the exercise of due and reasonable care assure protection to the
public from the disastrous consequences of concealed or latent defects in the
carrier's equipment, from the negligence of third parties, from latent defects in
the highways and streets, and from all the other hazards not generally disclosed
or guarded against by reasonable care, prudence and foresight.
Id. at 1187.
109. Id. at 1188.
110. See generally Calabresi & Hirschoff, Strict Liability, supra note 8.
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enterprise risk. Even when risk reduction, not loss distribution, is at
stake, then, enterprise liability embodies a distinctive conception of
risk reduction. Enterprise liability presses for the expansion of strict
liability on risk-reduction grounds even when it is unclear just how
strict liability will induce further risk reduction. This conception of
risk reduction cannot fairly be described as the pursuit of fault
objectives by other means. It tends to expand strict liability beyond
the point called for by fault conceptions of strict doctrines.
Lubin v. Iowa City"' provides

an even

more

striking

illustration of the tendency of enterprise liability ideas to expand the
domain of strict liability. Lubin extends strict liability to the operation
of a municipal waterworks. Interestingly, it does so without slotting
the case into any existing doctrinal category of strict liability, such as
abnormally dangerous activity, nuisance or trespass. Lubin extends
enterprise liability to losses arising out of bursting water pipes simply
because enterprise liability is, on the facts,11 2 fairer than negligence
liability. The Iowa City waterworks had adopted the practice of
leaving water pipes in the ground until they burst instead of
inspecting and replacing them at regular intervals. Under negligence
liability, this cost-justified practice would concentrate the costs of
inevitable pipe ruptures on those unlucky enough to suffer them. This
distribution of burdens and benefits offended the court's sense of
justice:
It is neither just nor reasonable that the city engaged in a proprietary activity can
deliberately and intentionally plan to leave a watermain underground beyond
inspection and maintenance until a break occurs and escape liability....
If the city accepts the advantages of lower maintenance costs and other benefits which
result from the practice of burying long lasting cast iron pipe six feet underground
beyond any reasonable opportunity to inspect .... it should also expect to pay for the
damages resulting from such practice as a cost of its doing business in this manner." 3

In the court's eyes, enterprise liability was preferable to negligence
liability because it would distribute the costs of inevitable accidents
across all of those who benefit from the practice of leaving pipes
buried until they burst:
The risks of such a method of operation should be borne by the water supplier who is in
a position to spread the cost among the consumers who are in fact the true
beneficiaries of this practice and of the resulting savings in inspection and
maintenance costs. When the expected and inevitable occurs, they should bear the loss

111. Lubin v. Iowa City, 131 N.V.2d 765 (Iowa 1964).
112. "[Wle believe the facts in this case disclose a situation in which liability should be
imposed upon the city without a showing of negligent conduct." Id. at 770.
113. Id. at 770-71.
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and not
the unfortunate individual whose property is damaged without fault of his
4
own.'"

The Lubin opinion assumes that these watermain ruptures are
accidents which should not be prevented. Imposing strict liability will
not-and is not intended to-induce the waterworks to exercise more
precaution. In this circumstance, the contrast between enterprise and
fault ideas is at its clearest. The fault aim of increased precaution does
not support the imposition of strict liability on the Iowa City
waterworks because the waterworks is already taking appropriate
precautions. Enterprise liability ideas, by contrast, do lead to strict
liability because strict liability spreads inevitable accident costs across
those who benefit from them.
The acceptance of enterprise liability rationales tends to
expand strict liabilities in other ways as well. It can, for example,
undermine some defenses and promote others. Chavez v. Southern
Pacific TransportationCo.,115 rejects a "public authorization" defense
immunizing common carriers from strict liability for "the
transportation of bombs the carrier was bound to ship" 116 on the
ground that such a defense is inconsistent with the logic of enterprise
liability:
A public authorization exception does have some basis in reason when strict liability is
imposed ... on [an] innocent but dangerous actor because his conduct is anti-social,
such liability would be inappropriate if specific public authorization is read to mean
that the conduct is socially desirable.
However... [tihere is no logical basis for a public authorization exception when [a]risk
distribution rationale is utilized to justify the strict liability standard. The need to
distribute the risk and the benefits to be derived from the distributions do not vary
according 7 to whether the dangerous activity is authorized by the state in some
manner."i

The "ultra-sensitivity" limit on abnormally dangerous activity
liability illustrates another way in which enterprise liability ideas can
shape tort doctrine. 118 Ultra-sensitivity makes special sense as a limit

114. Id. at 770.
115. Chavez v. S.Pac. Transp. Co., 413 F. Supp. 1203 (E.D. Cal. 1976).
116. Id. at 1209.
117. Id. at 1211.
118. Restatement Second § 524A "Plaintiffs Abnormally Sensitive Activity," provides "There
is no strict liability for harm caused by an abnormally dangerous activity if the harm would not
have resulted but for the abnormally sensitive character of the plaintiffs activity." The classic
application of this limit is to mink farmers who sue for damages caused by blasting, which
prompts mother minks to destroy their young. See Madsen v. East Jordan Irrigation Co., 125
P.2d 794 (Utah 1942); Foster v. Preston Mill Co., 268 P.2d 645 (Wash. 1954). But see Langan v.
Valicopters, 567 P.2d 218 (Wash. 1977) (imposing strict liability on aerial spraying of pesticides
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on abnormally dangerous activity liability when enterprise liability
ideas are used to justify the imposition of abnormally dangerous
activity liability. Some justification for this limit on liability is
required; the plaintiffs hypersentivity does not usually preclude
liability. Tortfeasors usually take their victims as they find them.119
But ultra-sensitivity to an abnormally dangerous activity precludes
recovery. Why? The answer lies in the logic of enterprise liability.
Ultra-sensitivity to an activity is not a species of "fault," but it is a
species of "characteristic risk." When a plaintiffs injury results from
her hypersensitivity to the defendant's activity, it seems right to say
that unusual susceptibility to the activity is one of her
"characteristics." It therefore makes conceptual sense-it accords with
the logic of enterprise liability-to exclude injuries attributable to the
plaintiffs hypersensitivity from the scope of the defendant's strict
liability.
B. Vicarious Liability
Vicarious liability cases interpreting the "scope of employment"
rule often analogize that rule to the rule of Workers' compensation law
authorizing recovery for injuries "arising out of and in the course of
employment." This analogy signals the presence of an enterprise
liability conception of respondeatsuperiordoctrine. Cases that connect
the two doctrines tend to interpret the scope of respondeat superior
more broadly than opinions which attribute fault aims to vicarious
liability.
The classic illustration of this point is Judge Friendly's famous
opinion in Ira S. Bushey & Sons u. United States.120 In Bushey, a
drunken sailor (Seaman Lane) returning to his ship at night "took it
into his head," for "reasons not apparent to [the court] or very likely to
12 1
Lane . .. to turn each of three large wheels some twenty times."

These wheels "controlled the flooding of the tanks on one side of the
drydock." 122 By turning them Lane flooded the drydock, causing the
ship to list, slide off its blocks, and fall against the wall. 'Parts of the
drydock sank, and the ship partially did-fortunately without loss of
life or personal injury."12

when that spraying damaged crops being raised by organic farmers, even though the spraying
was not harmful to conventional farmers).
119. See, e.g., Vosburg v. Putney, 56 N.W. 480 (Wisc. 1893).
120. Ira S. Bushey & Sons v. United States, 398 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1968).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 168.
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Bushey sought and received damages in federal district court
on the theory that the government, as Lane's employer, was
vicariously liable for his trespass. Lane's conduct, the district court
ruled, fell within the "scope of his employment" for policy reasons: the
Coast Guard was the most efficient precaution taker against the kind
of accident that had happened. On appeal, Judge Friendly affirmed
the result, but not the rationale. Citing both Calabresi and Coase, he
explained:
It is not at all clear, as the court below suggested, that expansion of liability... will

lead to a more efficient allocation of resources ...[A] more efficient allocation can only
be expected if there is some reason to believe that imposing a particular cost on the

enterprise will lead it to consider whether steps should be taken to prevent a
recurrence of the accident ....And the suggestion that imposition of liability will lead
to more intensive screening of employees rests on highly questionable premises ....It

could well be that application of the traditional rule [finding Lane's conduct to be
outside the scope of his employment] might induce drydock owners, prodded by their

insurance companies, to install locks on their valves to avoid similar incidents in the
future, while placing the burden on the shipowners is much less likely to lead to
accident prevention. 124

Indeed, "[t]he record reveal[ed] that most modern drydocks have
automatic locks to guard against unauthorized use of valves." 125
Optimal precaution concerns thus favored locking valves over
screening sailors, and so supported a restrictive reading of "scope of
employment" doctrine.
Friendly upheld the imposition of liability because fairness
favored liability, even if efficiency did not. Our sense of justice calls for
holding business enterprises liable for "accidents which may fairly be
said to be characteristic of [their activities]."1 2 6 "Characteristic"
accidents are those "that flow from [an enterprise's] long-run activity
in spite of all reasonable precautions on [its] part."12 7 Enterprises
should be held accountable for their characteristic risks because doing
so distributes the burdens and benefits of inevitable enterprise
accidents fairly. When enterprises are held liable for their
"characteristic" risks, those who benefit from the imposition of an
enterprise's risks will also bear the accident costs that flow from those
risks. Friendly's interpretation of the "scope of employment" rule thus

124. Id. at 170-71. Friendly cited Calabresi in connection with his observation that allocative

efficiency improvements will result only if the imposition of liability induces improved
precautions. He cites Cease in connection with his observation that placing liability on
shipowners is much less likely to lead to accident prevention (because drydock owners are the
ones in the position to take the cost-effective precaution and shipowners are unlikely to insist
upon drydock owners taking that precaution).
125. Id. at 171 n.6.
126. See id.
127. Id. at 171.
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turns on his imputation of a nonfault purpose to it. Had he taken fault
concerns with inducing optimal precaution to be the fundamental
justification for the rule, he would have construed the rule more
narrowly and excluded Seaman Lane's trespass from the scope of his
employment by the Coast Guard.
Has the enterprise liability conception of the scope of
employment under respondeat superior law triumphed over fault
conceptions? Hardly. No less articulate a proponent of fault liability
than Richard Posner himself now makes the case for a fault
conception of the doctrine. In Konradi v. United States,12 he explains
the strictness of vicarious liability law's scope of employment rule in
the same way that he explains the strictness of abnormally dangerous
activity liability-as an attempt to induce firms to conduct their
activities at the cost-justified level. Judge Posner elaborates:
Often an employer can reduce the number of accidents caused by his employees not by
being more careful-he may already be using as much care in hiring, supervising,

monitoring, etc. his employees as can reasonably be demanded-but by altering the
nature or extent of his operations: in a word by altering not his care but his activity.
This possibility is a consideration in deciding whether to impose strict liability
129
generally. ...

For Posner, the strictness of vicarious liability is an expression of the
fundamental aim of fault liability. The end of vicarious liability is
attainment of the cost-justified--or, if you prefer, the reasonablelevel of precaution.
Extant in our law, then, is a contest between fault and
enterprise conceptions of vicarious liability doctrine. The contest is
most evident in the opinions of learned and sophisticated judges like
Friendly, Posner, and Calabresi, 130 but it surfaces in less learned and
sophisticated opinions as well. Consider two recent California
Supreme Court decisions- Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles 131 and Lisa
M. v. Henry Mayo Newhall Memorial Hospital.3 2 The plaintiff in Mary
M., who had been drinking, was stopped for erratic driving by a police
officer. After performing poorly on a sobriety test, she pleaded with
the officer not to jail her. He drove her home and raped her.
Reversing the intermediate appellate court, the California
Supreme Court ruled that, when "a police officer on duty misuses his
official authority by raping a woman who he has detained, the public

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Konradi v. United States, 919 F.2d 1207 (7th Cir. 1990).
Id. at 1210.
Calabresi's contribution is Taber v.Maine,45 F.3d 598 (2d Cir. 1995).
Mary IVL v. City of Los Angeles, 814 P.2d 1341 (CaL 1991).
Lisa MKv. Henry Mayo Newhall Meml Hosp., 907 P.2d 358 (Cal. 1995).
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entity that employs him can be held vicariously liable." 133 Although
"sexual assaults by police officers are fortunately uncommon;" they are
not so "unusual or startling" that they cannot "fairly be regarded as
typical of or broadly incidental" to the "enterprise of law
34

enforcement."1

The danger that an officer will commit a sexual assault while on duty arises from the

considerable authority and control inherent in the responsibilities of an officer in
An officer who detains an individual is acting as the official
enforcing the law....
representative of the state, with all of its coercive power .
13
formidable power is the potential for abuse. 5

. .

. Inherent in this

Writing for the majority, Justice Kennard concluded that "[t]he cost
resulting from misuse of that power should be borne by the
community, because of the substantial benefits that the community
derives from the lawful exercise of police power."'136 Kennard's
conclusion is, plainly, an expansive interpretation of the scope of
employment under vicarious liability law, an interpretation justified
by enterprise liability ideas.
Lisa M. involved similar facts, but a different outcome. The
nineteen year old plaintiff, who was pregnant, sought treatment in a
hospital emergency room for injuries suffered in a fall. An emergency
room physician ordered an ultrasound examination to determine if the
fetus had been injured. The ultrasound technician rejected plaintiffs
request that her mother and boyfriend be allowed to accompany her.
After completing the prescribed examination, he asked the plaintiff if
she would like to learn the gender of her baby. When she said that she
would, he sexually molested her under the pretense of conducting an
ultrasound examination. The Supreme Court once again reversed the
intermediate appellate court, this time ruling that the technician's
conduct fell outside the scope of his employment as a matter of law.
Mary M. was distinguished. While the technician "abused his position
137
of trust" he "had no legal or coercive authority over plaintiff."
Therefore, the court concluded, although "the hospital may have set
the stage" for the technician's conduct, "the script was entirely of his
own independent invention."'1 8 It would therefore "be unfair" to
139
impose liability on the hospital.

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Mary M., 814 P.2d at 1352.
Id.
Id. at 1348.
Id. at 1349.
Lisa M., 907 P.2d at 306.
Id.
Id.
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Justice Kennard dissented. She would have affirmed the Court
of Appeals and let the jury decide if the technician was acting within
the scope of his employment. "[A] trier of fact might," she explained:
reasonably conclude that Tripoli's employment as an ultrasound technician did have
certain "peculiar aspects" that played a not insignificant role in the sexual assault. To
perform an ultrasound examination on a pregnant woman, a technician rubs a gel on
the woman's exposed lower abdomen. This intimate contact, inherent in the job, put
plaintiff in a vulnerable position and permitted Tripoli to dupe plaintiff into believing
that his sexual assault was actually part of a standard medical procedure, thereby
giving Tripoli a basis to hope that his misconduct would remain undetected. Moreover,
it is not unreasonable to infer that the intimate contact inherent in the job contributed
to Tripoli's sexual arousal and incited him to engage in the misconduct. In short, a
reasonable trier of fact could conclude that this sexual assault ... may fairly be
attributed to risks arising from, and inherent in, the "peculiar aspects" of Tripolrs
employment' 40

Where Mary M. interprets the scope of employment rule expansively
in accordance with enterprise liability ideas, Lisa M. interprets that
rule narrowly-in a manner inconsistent with both the holding and
the rationale of Mary M. The majority's opinion in Lisa M. speaks the
nonfault language of vicarious liability law, and it declines to overrule
Mary M., but it subverts the ends of enterprise liability. As Justice
Kennard, the author of Mary M., recognizes, the enterprise liability
logic of Mary M. calls for upholding the intermediate appellate court's
ruling.
The position of the California Supreme Court as a whole brings
to mind Young B. Smith's remark that "the way in which a rule is
applied depends more or less upon what the particular court conceives
to be the reason for the rule." 141 California law concerning the "scope
of employment" in vicarious liability law is "inconsisten[t] and
confus[ed]" because the members of the California Supreme Court
disagree about the justifications for respondeatsuperiorliability. Mary
M. expresses an enterprise liability conception of vicarious liability
whereas Lisa M. "doubts the wisdom" of vicarious liability's
commitment to strict liability. Although the majority opinion in Lisa
M. is scrupulously careful to speak the language of enterprise liability,
it is equally careful not to adopt an enterprise liability interpretation
of the scope of employment. The Lisa M. majority seems caught
between dislike of vicarious liability law's nonfault character and the
doctrine's deep entrenchment in our law. Unable to uproot the
doctrine, the Lisa M. majority is reduced to interpreting "scope of
employment" in a disingenuously narrow fashion.

140. Id. at 372.
141. Smith, supra note 16.
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Chief Justice George's concurring opinion in Lisa M. supports a

more specific conjecture that a preference for fault liability lies behind
the majority's narrow interpretation of "scope of employment." George
cites to his opinion in another sexual harassment case, Farmer's
Insurance Group v. County of Santa Clara,142 interpreting scope of
employment narrowly-along the lines of Lisa M. Indeed, George's
concurrence in Farmer's Insurance argues for overruling Mary M.
precisely because its broader, enterprise liability interpretation of the
scope of vicarious liability doctrine is inconsistent both with the
narrow interpretation of the doctrine given in Farmer'sInsurance and
with fault liability. George asks:
Why should the public bear the financial burden imposed as a result of such
misconduct [rape by an on-duty police officer], in situations where there has been no
showing that
the public entity was negligent either in hiring or supervising its
43
employee?1

Absent fault, in other words, there should be no vicarious liability.
George's fault sentiments are echoed by the Lisa M.4 4 and Farmer's
145
Insurancemajority opinions.
We cannot, however, be sure that a partially submerged
preference for fault liability underpins the narrow interpretations of
"scope of employment" adopted by Lisa M. and Farmer's Insurance.
The opinions insist-unconvincingly-that all of the rationales for
vicarious liability support their narrow interpretations. What we can
say is that fault arguments justify the rulings of these cases whereas

142. Farmer's Ins. Group v. County of Santa Clara, 906 P.2d 440 (Cal.1995).
143. Id. at 461.
144.
Although imposition of vicarious liability would likely lead to adoption of some
further precautionary measures, we are unable to say whether the overall impact
would be beneficial to or destructive of the quality of medical care. Hospital and
its amici curiae predict imposition of respondeat superior liability would lead
health care providers to overreact by monitoring, for possible sexual misconduct,
every interaction between patient and health care worker.
Lisa M., 907 P.2d at 304.
145. The FarmersInsurancemajority, for example, wrote:
[W]e find it significant that public entities such as the County are already
required by FEHA to "take all reasonable steps to prevent harassment from
occurring." FEHA makes it unlawful for public entities and any persons acting as
their agents to sexually harass any employee or applicant, and for public entities
to fail to take immediate and appropriate corrective action if they know or should
know of sexual harassment by employees other than agents or supervisors ....
FarmersIns., 906 P.2d at 1014.
Because this potential for direct liability already furnishes powerful motivation for the
County to establish and maintain programs and procedures designed to eliminate sexual
harassment at jail, the imposition of vicarious liability is not essential to "create [ ] a strong
incentive for vigilance by those in a position 'to guard substantially against the evil to be
prevented." Id. at 456 (quoting Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles, 814 P.2d 1341 (Cal. 1991)).
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enterprise liability rationales do not. For our purposes, that is all we
need to say. Our point, after all, is simply that the scope of vicarious
liability is sensitive to the choice between fault and enterprise
justifications for the doctrine. And the conflict between Mary M. and
Lisa M. amply supports that point.
III. ENTERPRISE LIABILITY WITHIN NEGLIGENCE LAW
The basic argument of this Paper is that the Restatement
(Third): General Principlesis mistaken in its argument that there is
no general theory of strict liability, just particular instances of it. The
paper argues that there is indeed a general conception of strict
liability, and a distinctively modern general conception at that,
namely, the conception of strict liability found in the theory of
enterprise liability. That theory originates in the Workers'
Compensation Acts enacted around the turn of the twentieth century.
From its stronghold in those Acts, the theory of enterprise liability
penetrates into the law of torts, enabling legal scholars and judges to
reconceive and reconfigure the common law of torts. At the turn of the
twenty-first century, enterprise liability conceptions compete with
fault conceptions for control over various domains of the common law
of torts.
The domains that we have examined so far are mostly domains
of strict liability. It is a mistake, however, to suppose that enterprise
liability conceptions only influence strict liability doctrines. Enterprise
liability conceptions can also permeate fault-based doctrines, a point
that Robert Rabin has recently stressed. 46 The argument that
enterprise liability conceptions shape fault doctrines as well as strict
doctrines is, in fact, an old one. Jeremiah Smith's prophetic claim that
the enterprise liability theory of the Workers' Compensation Acts
would come to exert a powerful influence on the common law of torts
rested in part on the observation that negligence liability itself could
be recast as a much stricter form of liability by relaxing the
requirements of the prima facie case, construing res ipsa loquitur
liberally and inverting the burden of proof.147 Upon reflection,
moreover, it seems logical that, just as there are fault conceptions of
strict doctrines, so too there should be enterprise conceptions of fault
doctrines. If instances of strict liability might be seen as cases where
fault ideas call for strict doctrines, why might not some instances of

146. Robert Rabin, Some Thoughts on the Ideology of Enterprise Liability, 55 MD. L REV.
1190 (1996).
147. See generally Smith, supra note 15.
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fault liability be seen as the expression of enterprise liability ideas?
This, after all, is one aspect of the Barker regime for product defects.
That regime is animated by enterprise liability ideas, but Barker
adopts a modified risk-utility test as one of its two tests of product
defectiveness. Risk-utility balancing, performed with hindsight and
coupled to a relaxed prima facie case, was used both as a way of
setting strict liability off from negligence, and as a device for
identifying the "characteristic risks" of a product's design.
Rabin's insight is related, but different. He asserts that the
idea of enterprise liability expresses a shift "from a corrective justice
perspective on responsibility in tort law to a collective justice
approach." 148 "More specifically," he argues that enterprise liability
ideas express "a shift from a framework in which considerations of
interpersonal justice are paramount to one in which notions of what is
best for society are dominant." 149 I would put the point a bit
differently. Enterprise liability can be justified on grounds of
interpersonal fairness as well as social welfare-that, in fact, is what
the enterprise liability idea of fairness does. 150 But even so-even if I
am correct that enterprise liability can be justified by an idea of
interpersonal fairness-the enterprise liability conception of tort still
differs from the corrective justice conception, and in a way which has
much to do with the distinction that Rabin posits between corrective
and collective justice. Enterprise liability expresses a distributive-as
opposed to a corrective-conception of justice.151 It seeks to distribute
the burdens and benefits of risky, but beneficial, activitiesfairly.
Enterprise liability's focus on distributive justice is thus closely
tied to its focus on activities as opposed to acts. 152 Enterprise liability
is an effort to make activities bear their characteristic accident costs.
It is, then, no coincidence that Oliver Wendell Holmes noted the
distinction between acts and activities, and its importance to the
future of tort law, around the time that enterprise liability burst fullblown upon the law of accidents. "Our law of torts," Holmes wrote,
"comes from the old days of isolated, ungeneralized wrongs, assaults,
slanders, and the like" but,
the torts with which our courts are kept busy today are mainly the incidents of certain

148. Rabin, supra note 146, at 1193.
149. Id. at 1193 n.22.
150. See Gregory C. Keating, The Idea of Fairness in the Law of Enterprise Liability, 95
MICH. L. REV.1266 (1997).
151. See Gregory C. Keating, Distributiveand Corrective Justicein the Tort Law of Accidents,
74 S.CAL. L. REV. 193 (2000).
152. See Keating, supra note 150, at 1287-95.
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well known businesses.... railroads, factories, and the like. The liability for them is
estimated, and sooner or later goes into the price paid by the public. The public really
pays the damages, and the question of liability, if pressed far enough, is really the
question how far it is desirable that the public should insure the safety of those whose
work it uses."-3

Shift the target of tort law from acts to activities and you shift from a
framework where corrective justice is done to one where a species of
54
distributive justice is done.'
Even with these adjustments, though, Rabin's insight is
substantially correct: enterprise liability is trained on activities as
opposed to acts, and it therefore has a more "collective" character in
an important sense. It takes organized practices, not isolated acts, as
its prey. But how is this insight related to negligence liability?
Enterprise liability's concern with distributive justice is one of the
things that leads it to favor strict liability over negligence. Enterprise
liability seeks to disperse an activity's accident costs across the
activity, and that aspiration is more fully realized by strict liability
than by negligence.155
The fact that enterprise liability is most fully realized by strict
liability does not, however, undermine Rabin's point. Rabin's point is
that modern tort law absorbs much of enterprise liability's logic even
when it adopts fault rules. For example, when courts single out
psychiatrists for special duties to warn potential victims of dangerous
patients, courts are relying on the character of the psychiatric
enterprise to justify moving from a regime of "no duty" to a regime of
fault. 156 The Tarasoff duty to warn rests on the premise that
psychiatrists engage in a special kind of enterprise, an enterprise
which makes them uniquely well situated to identify those persons
57
who are especially likely to inflict violent injury on others.
Psychiatrists are, moreover, in a decent position to dispose the costs of
harms inflicted by dangerous patients across the psychiatric
enterprise.
Conversely, when a court relies on the amateur status of a man
who constructed a home for his own use to justify refusing to impose a
duty of careful construction to a subsequent purchaser-to justify

153. OLIVER WENDELL HOLmES JR., The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 167,
183 (Peter Smith ed., 1952). Holmes originally delivered the paper on January 8, 1897, at the
dedication of a new hall at the Boston University School of Law.
154. See Keating, supra note 151.
155. For an argument to this effect see Gregory C. Keating, Distributive and Corrective
Justice in Tort Theory, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming Southern California Law Review) (on file
with author).
156. See Rabin, supra note 149, at 1200-01.
157. Id. at 1200.
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moving from a fault regime to a regime of "no-duty"-the court is also
acting on enterprise liability logic. Individual, amateur masons, who
are neither trained nor engaged in the enterprise of masonry, cannot
reduce the risks of defective construction or disperse those risks across
the enterprise of homebuilding in the way that professional masons
and real estate developers can. So too, when courts move "to a more
robust principle of fault in medical malpractice cases"' 5 8 by
abandoning the same locality rule, using res ipsa more expansively,
and adopting less restrictive standards for qualifying experts and
establishing informed consent claims, they are effecting enterprise
liability ends by negligence means. They are expanding the liability of
the "medical enterprise" and they are doing so in part because they
are aware of the risk-reducing and risk-spreading capacities of those
organizations that provide heath care. 159 Other examples come readily
to mind. Enterprise liability ends are being effected, for example,
when courts abolish charitable immunities on the ground that they
are no longer needed to induce the provision of important services
because the charitable institutions involved can insure against any
liability.160
In a wide range of cases where the applicability of strict
liability is not on the table, then, decisions about the imposition and
character of negligence liability are made on enterprise liability
grounds. This underscores two important facts. First, enterprise
liability and strict liability are distinct phenomena, however much the
former invites the latter. Second-and perhaps more importantlyenterprise liability's entrenchment in the common law of accidents is
even greater than its influence on common law strict liabilities
suggests. Enterprise liability ideas permeate contemporary examples
of fault liability so thoroughly that their influence would continue to
be substantial even if we could, somehow, purge the law of accidents of
those strict liabilities that are the natural habitats of enterprise
liability.

158. Id.
159. Id. Note that this is the use of res ipsa anticipated by Jeremiah Smith.
160. See, e.g., Pierce v. Yakima Valley Mem'l. Hosp. Ass'n, 260 P.2d 765, 771 (Wash. 1953)
(abolishing the charitable immunity of hospitals, in part because liability insurance is now
available to distribute the cost of malpractice liability, and quoting Georgetown College v.
Hughes, 130 F.2d 810, 824 (D.C. 1942) ("What is at stake, so far as the charity is concerned, is
the cost of reasonable protection, the amount of the insurance premium as an added burden on
its finances, not the awarding over in damages of its entire assets.")).
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IV. ENTERPRISE LIABILITY AND THE THIRD RESTATEMENT

To recapitulate: The Restatement (Third) makes the striking
and bold claim that existing areas of strict liability are simply a set of
special cases. That claim writes a huge chunk of tort history and tort
theory out of the law. There is a general and distinctively modern
theory of strict liability-namely, enterprise liability-and it has
exerted a substantial influence on our law throughout the course of
the twentieth century. The theory of enterprise liability burst fullblown onto the legal landscape in the Workers' Compensation Acts of
the early twentieth century and spread from those acts back into the
law of torts, reshaping our understanding of various common law
strict liabilities. To be sure, enterprise liability has waned during the
past twenty years, as G. Edward White argues in his contribution to
this conference, 161 but it has hardly disappeared from our tort law
entirely. Indeed, close examination might prove that it has merely
gone underground and that it, in fact, shapes the most important tort
phenomena of the 1990s, namely, the tobacco cases. Be that as it may,
however, enterprise liability conceptions of strict liability are alive and
well today, both in the rulings and rhetoric of courts across the
country and in contemporary legal scholarship.'6 Indeed, as long as instances of strict liability are extant in our
law, it seems safe to say that it is all but impossible to purge
enterprise liability ideas from the law of torts. Enterprise liability
spread from the Workers' Compensation Acts into the law of torts in
the first place by supplying a unifying theory capable of justifying
preexisting forms of strict liability as expressions of a defensible,
general theory of responsibility for accidental harm. The very act of
characterizing all instances of strict liability as special cases paves the
way for the success of a general theory that shows those areas to
express a coherent general conception. As long as there are instances
of strict liability, and as long as the fault principle can only explain
each such instance as a special case, enterprise liability will attract
adherents. It will do so simply because the unity that it finds makes

161. See G. Edward White, The Unexpected Persistenceof Nyegligence 1980.2000, 54 VAND. L.
REV. 1337, 1344-46 (2001).
162. See e.g., Taber v. Maine, 45 F.3d 598 (2d Cir. 1995) (Calabresi, J.) (adopting enterprise

liability view of the scope of employment under vicarious liability law); Brooks v. Beech Aircraft
Corp., 902 P.2d 54 (N.M. 1995) (adopting enterprise liability view of design defect law); Danny v.
Ford Motor Co., 662 N.E.2d 730 (N.Y. 1995) (approving use of consumer expectation test in

design defect litigation and describing liability under this test as "true 'strice liability").
Important recent scholarship favoring enterprise liability in tort include the works by Logue,
Croley & Hanson, and Nolan & Ursin, supra note 8.
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better sense of various strict liabilities than the various ad hoc
explanations offered by the adherents of fault liability.
By ignoring the history and theory of enterprise liability and
claiming that existing areas of strict liability are a set of special cases,
the Restatement (Third) begs the question it purports to answer.
Existing areas of strict liability are special cases only so long as we
assume the supremacy of the fault principle and ignore the existence
of enterprise liability. That assumption, however, ignores the history
and rhetoric of our tort law, and the scholarship that has
characterized and influenced it. History, rhetoric and scholarship
show that the law of torts is torn between two competitive principles
of responsibility. One conception-the fault conception-asserts that
actors should be held responsible for accidental harm only when they
should have prevented that harm from occurring. The other
conception-the enterprise liability conception-asserts that actors
should bear the costs of those accidents that are "characteristic" of
their activities and then distribute those costs among all those who
benefit from the imposition of the risks at issue. The choice between
these competing conceptions matters. Conceive of strict liability as a
set of anomalous exceptions to an otherwise dominant fault principle
and the domain of fault liability will tend to expand while the domain
of strict liability contracts. Conceive of those very same "pockets" of
strict liability as expressions of a general principle of responsibility for
accidental injury and the domain of strict liability will tend to expand
while the domain of fault liability contracts.
More importantly, the choice between these two competing
general conceptions of responsibility is not forced upon us by the
details of the black-letter law. Our law is elastic enough to be made
more strict under the influence of enterprise liability ideas, just as it is
elastic enough to be made more negligence oriented under the
influence of fault ideas. The general outlines of tort history prove as
much. Enterprise liability ideas reshaped the law throughout much of
the twentieth century; fault ideas appear to be reshaping the law
now. 163 The choice between these two competing conceptions-or, more
accurately, the choice about how to reconcile these two competing
conceptions, giving each its proper sphere-is not one that law or
history makes for us. It is one that we must make ourselves. We must
make it by appealing to the justifications we have for holding people
163. Compare Priest, supra note 11 (arguing that enterprise liability reshaped the law of
torts in the mid-twentieth century) and WHITE, supra note 18, at 168-72 (describing triumph of
enterprise liability in products liability law) with White, supranote 161 (describing resurgence of
negligence liability in the past twenty years).
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accountable for the injuries that they accidentally inflict upon others.
We must make the choice by appealing to the considerations of agency
and responsibility, fairness and efficiency, that might justify
preferring one conception of responsibility to another.
Our tort law of accidents is, in short, torn. Strict enterprise
liability and fault liability coexist uneasily with one another; the
justifications for the one are criticisms of the other. Because our law of
torts is torn between these two general principles, any effort to
"restate" the "general principles" of our law must acknowledge that
fact or risk being nothing more than a partisan brief for one party to
the debate. Yet, this is the very risk that Restatement (Third) runs. It
denies that there is any general conception of responsibility capable of
justifying tort law's various instances of strict liability, and it writes
enterprise liability out of the law of torts. The problem here is equal
parts politics, history, and jurisprudence. Politically, the problem is
one of falsely characterizing the law as it is to promote a particular
conception of the law as it should be. The Restatement (Third) reads
all too much like a document which proposes to increase the future
prominence of fault liability in tort by overstating the present
prominence of fault liability in tort. This is an illicit sleight of hand.
Historically, the problem is that the Restatement (Thirdys
description of our tort law of accidents writes the past century out of
our law. In describing strict liability as a set of exceptional special
cases, the Restatement (Third) eerily repeats Jeremiah Smith's
description of the common law of torts prior to the passage of the
Workers' Compensation Acts. Even Smith himself, however, foresaw
that the appearance of the Workers' Compensation Acts would make
this account of the common law untenable. We, who have seen many
of his prophesies come to pass, can hardly credit the account of law he
found incredible eighty long years ago.
Jurisprudentially, the problem is that the Restatement (Third)
takes a position in an ongoing controversy instead of acknowledging
that controversy and finding a way to perch atop it. Before we can
restate the law we must state it. A statement of tort law's general
principles of responsibility for harm done should acknowledge that our
common law recognizes two competing conceptions. At the level of
general principle, the common law of torts does not speak with a
single voice; it is a debate between two different voices. A Restatement
of General Principlesneeds both to acknowledge the existence of this
debate and to take a position on it-not a position in it.

